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Absolute flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) might increase
significantly in some countries, but the developing countries'
share of total world FDI flows will probably remain relatively
low (about 15 percent) largely because FDI in the United States
will continue  at high  levels.  To attract more foreign direct
investment, developing countries must maintain both favorable
macroeconomic policies and a climate favorable to FbI.
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Drawing on the findings in 11 country studies,  Policy reform designed to attract investors
Brewer conk  .jdes  that the public policy environ-  will be only marginally effective unless accom-
ment for foreign direct investment (FDI) has  panied by appropriatc macroeconomic policies.
improved in recent years.  There is more appre-  Marginal, isolated policy changes are not
ciation of FDI's contributions (such as the  enough.  Investors risk estimates are highly
transfer of technology and managerial skills, the  sensitive to perceptions of change and unccr-
development of export markets, and the stimula-  tainty.
tion of local entrcpreneurship, competition, and
innovation)  and greater appreciation of the role  Developed countries' guarantee programs to
of the private sector and private investment in  protect their own investors against noncommer-
development.  cial risks associated with FDI projects in devel-
oping countries - together with other developed
But to improve the flow of FDI into develop-  country promotional activities - are an impor-
ment, more is needed - especially changes in  tant part of the policy framework that affects FDI
policies toward FDI and changes in macroeco-  in developing countries.
nomic policies and conditions.
Total FDI flows to developing countries are
Positive policy shifts have improvcd the  unlikely to rise significantly in the next few
climate for FDJ in Korea, Mexico, and Nigeria.  years.  Average flows of about SDR 15 billion a
Continuing restrictions limit FDI flows to India,  year (or 1 percent of developing countries' GDP)
Brazil, and some of the largest developing  are likely for the next threc years.
countries.  Macroeconomric  conditions and
policies will continue to affect FDI flows and to  Absolute flows of FDI might increase
dominate investors' decisions, as recent experi-  significantly in some countries but the develop-
ences in Mexico and Brazil indicate.  ing countries' share of total world FDI flows will
probably remain relatively low (about 15 per-
cent) largely because FDI in the United States
will continue at high levels.
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Introduction
The low  level  of foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  in developing  countries
during portions  of the 1980s, in combination  with the increased  burden of
servicing their external debt, has prompted renewed interest in ways to
facilitate  FDI.  This renewed  interest  has been reflected  in more favorable
policies  toward  FDI  in  the  host  countries  and  in  the  initiatives  of international
institutions.  This  increased  activity  has  created  a  need  for  readily  available
information  concerning  patterns  in FDI in developing  countries,  host country
policies,  and  other  conditions  that  affect  investment.
Purpose  and  ScoRe  of the  Study
This study provides a  summary of patterns, policies, and prospects
concerning  FDI in developing  countries.  The focus oi the study is on host
country policies, but  the policies of home governments  and  international
institutions  also are analyzed. The study  concludes  with a projection  of the
prospects  for VI  flows  to developing  countries.  it provides  a wide-ranging
treatment  that  is intended  to serve  as  a basis  for  discussions  about  a  variety
of issues  related  to FDI.1
The  emphasis  of the  study  is  on the  factors  that  affect  the  patterns  and
trends  of FDI  in  developing  countries. Implicit  to  the  study  is  the  theme  that
FDI  can  make significant  contributions  to  the  long-term  development  process  and
that  policy  reforms  that  cont:.ibute  to  greater  FDI  are  consequently  desirable.
The  roles  of  the  private  sector  in  the  development  process,  and  the  contributions
of  private  FDI  in  particular  have  long  been  debated. It  is,  nevertheless,  useful
to  review  briefly  the  case  in  favor  of fostering  an  even  greater  role  for  F!I  In
the  long-term  development  process  because  much recent  discussion  about  FDI  has
been  slanted  toward  relieving  the  external  debt  burder.  of developing  countries,
especially  in the short term.  Relief,  however,  has its price in the  higher
yields  on FDI  compared  with interest  on loans  (Caprio,  Gelb,  and  Johnson  1989).
The recipient  countries  also face the riXk that if the investors  repatriate
capital, funds will be  lost when most needed; if the recipients  prohibit
repatriation,  they  will lose  their  creditability.
Whatever  its contribution  to short-term  debt relief  may be, FDI can be
u!nderstood  and appreciated  as a package  of resources  that complements  other
financial  flows  to  developing  countries  and  makes  a distinctive  contribution  in
the  development  process. Indeed,  it  is  precisely  the  nonfinancial  components  of
the  direct  investment  package  and  their  long-term  effects  that  are  often  the  most
important  in the  development  process.
FDI projects  typically  involve  a transfer  of technology  and managerial
skills  from  the  source  country  to the  recipient  country. Although  the  extent,
form,  and appropriateness  of the technology  are  often at issue  in individual
projects,  there  is  no  doubt  that  in  the  aggregate  FDI  is  an  important  channel  for
transferr'.ng  technology  and  managerial  skills  to developing  countries.2
FDI  projects  also  can provide  greater  access  to  world  markets  for  host-
country exports.  Because  of their ties to parent corporations  in the home
country  and  other  affiliated  corporations  in  third-country  markets,  FDI  projects
in developing  countrios  facilitate  market  penetration  and market  expansion  in
countries  where  they  have  corporate  connections.  Further  benefits  in  the  economy
of the  host  country  ran  occur  as the -sult of the  stimulus  FDI  often  gives  to
local  entrepreneurs,  competitors,  and  nnovators. The entry  of a foreign  firm
using  different  components  or assembl)  techniques,  for example,  can  have such
effects.
In  addition  to these  benefits  of FDI  are  the  usual  employment  and  income-
generating  effects  of  an  investment--whether  undertaken  by a  domestic  or  foreign
firm--and the  immediate or long-term balance of payments effects of  the
associated  international  financial  flows. There  are,  of  course,  social  costs  as
well as benefits  associated  wich FDI projects.  For instance,  FDI can have
adverse effects in a highly protected  environment,  by leading  to high cost
production.  There  are,  moreover,  important  issues  about  the  distribution  of  the
costs and  benefits  within  and  between  the host and home countries.  Although
these  additional  considerations  can  mitigate  ard  complicate  the  net  beneficial
effects  of FDI  in the  host  country,  they  do not  alter  the  contribution  that  FDI
can  make in the long-term  development  process. There is therefore  a need for
countries  to adopt  policies  that  are  more  conducive  to FDI  so that  its  role in
the  development  process  can  be expanded.
The analysis  of FDI presented  here is based in substantial  part on the
country  studies  that  appear  in  Foreign  Direct  Investment  in Selected  De loping
Countries  in the  Last  Two  Decades  by Gyorgy  Becsky,  Young-Hoi  Lee,  and  Aloysius
Ordu.  Those recently completed jtudies  concern FDI in eleven countries:
Argentina,  Btazil,  Colombia,  and Mexico in Latin  America; India,  Indonesia,
Malaysia,  Republic  of Korea,  and Thailand  in Asia; and Nigeria and Kenya in
Africa. Those  countries  were  selected  for  their  geographic,  economic,  and  policy
diversity;  they include  both oil exporters  and oil importers.  Some of the
countries  have  adopt-d  relatively  restrictive  policies  toward  FDI,  while  others
have been more open,  especially  in recent  vears.  Mosz of them  are major  FDI
recipients,  and many  are  newly  industrialized  co'-ntries  with  substantial  exports
of  manufactured goods.  They have  collectively  been  the  recipients of
approximately  half  of the  FDI  flows  to  all  de  -eloping  countries  during  the  past
decade. In total,  these  eleven  countries  provid  ,  useful  sample  for  the  study
of FCI.
Data Issues
Foreign  direct  investment  is a long-term  investment  that  can  include  new
equity investments,  reinvested  earnings, and related lending.  Any  given
investment  can involve  establishing, acquiring,  or expanding  an affiliated
subsidiary  corporation  or branch. An essential  element  of a direct  investment
(contrasted  with  a  portfolio  investment)  is  a  continuing  substantial  interest  ir.,
and an effective  voice in,  managing  the real assets  of  a foreign  affiliated
entity. An ownership  share  of at least  10 to  25 percent  is  commonly  considered
the  minimum  threshold  for  an  investment  to  be  considered  a  direct  investment,  but
the  essential  ingredient  is  control  over  asbets. Where  there  is  no eubstantial
influence in the management  of the foreign enterprise,  the  investment  is3
considered  a  portfolio  equity  investment.2
There are numerous  sources  of data on PDI,  and no single  source  is by
itself  necessarily  adequate  for  a given  purpo.e. For  the  most  part,  this  study
uses data on FDI flows  reported  by the International  Monetary  Fund's (IMF)
Balance  of Payments  Statistics  Yearbook  and  International  Financial  Statisiics.
The  IMF's data  on  FDI  have  several virtues:  they provide relatively
comprehensive  country  coverege,  extend  over many  years, are  based on a broad
notion  of  FDI,  and  facilitate  cross-national  comparisons.  In  preparinlg  these  two
volumes, IMF data have been supplemented  by data froin  she Organization  for
Economic Co-operation  and Development  (OECD),  t-he  Unitad Nations Centre on
Transnational  Corp  rations  (UNCTC),  national  governments,  and  other  organizations
and  individuals.
One important  difference  between  this  paper  and  earlier  World  Bank Staff
Working  Papers  on FDI is the  principal  source  of FDI  data that  has  been used. 3
Whejreas  the present paper relies  primarily  on IMF data, the previous  papers
relied  extensively  on OECD data.  Thus,  any  comparisons  between  data in those
papers  and the  present  volume  should  be made  with  considerable  caution;  this  is
particularly  true  with regard  to  time  series  analyses  that  extend  back in ti-"
prior to 1975.4  Appendix  1 of this report  provides  an in-dcpth  oomparison
between  alternative  sources  of FDI  data.
Despite  these  data  issues,  basic  patterns  and  trends  can  be discerned  for
the  developing  countries  as  a  whole (see  chapter  2) and  for  the  eleven  selectee
countries (see chapter 3).  Following these descriptions  of the centra'
tendencies  and  variations  in the  basic data,  subsequent  chapters  consider  the
variables  that  influence  these  patterns  and  trends. Chapter  4  considers  the  host
country  economic  and  political  environment,  chapter  5  considers  host  country  FDI
policies, and  chapter 6  considers the  policies of  home  governments  and
international  institutions.  Chapter  7 concludes  the  study  with an analysis  of
the  prospects  for  the  future  of  FDI  in  each  of the  eleven  selected  countries,  as
well as for  all  developing  countvies  collectively.4
Chapl'er  2
Overall  Patterns  and  Trends
Frcm  the  1950s  until  the  mid-1960s,  net  FDI  flows  to devLloping  countries
remained  at relatively  low  leveis  of $2  billion  dollars  or .ess  a  year.  During
this  period  there  was  substantial  disinvestment--some  voluntary,  some  forced--ir
petroleum,  mining,  agriculture,  and  manufacturing.  Beginning  in the  late  1960s
annual  net flows  increased  until  they  reached  a peak in 1981  of $'5.3  billion,
or about  one-half  percent  of th-.  developing  countries'  GDP.  These increased
flows of  FDI  were responses to  the  combination  of  ec nomic growth and
industrialization  in  several  large  developing  countries,  more  hospitable  policies
in some of the host countries,  and more flexible  policies  on the part of
investors.
The four-year  period  from  1983  through  1986  was  marked  by lower  levels  of
annual  flows  of  $10.2  billion  to  $11.2  billion  (SDR9.7  billion  to
SDR9.2  billion). In the  latter  part  of the  decade,  however,  there  was  a  modest
reversal,  with  annual  flows  exceeding  $15  billion (see  table  2-1  for  additional
details  on the  absolute  magnitudes  of the  flows).
Table  2-1:  Absolute  Magnitudes  of FDI Flows
to  All Developing  Countries,  1975-88
Current  U.S.  Constant  U.S.
Year  SDRs  dollars  dollrars
1975  5.4  6.3  10.0
1976  4.1  4.8  7.6
1977  5.5  6.7  7.4
1978  6.1  8.0  9.9
1979  7.9  10.3  11.3
1980  8.6  10.9  10.9
1981  13.1  15.3  15.2
1982  12.3  13.6  13.8
1983  9.7  10.2  10.5
1984  10.3  10.1  10.7
1985  11.6  12.7  13.4
1986  9.2  11.2  10.0
1987  11.d  16.7  13.6
19888  1?.7  18.5  13.9
a. Preliminary  figures.
Source: IMF5
Shifts  in t-he  relative  importance  of FDI in the  total  flow  of financial
resources  to the  developing  countries  are  appa'rent  in table  2-2. Although  FDI
flows  were only 12.8 percent  of the total  net flow of financial  resources  in
1980,  they  had increased  to 20.9  percent  in 1986,  and  according  to preliminary
figures,  to  33.4  percent  in  1987. This  reflects  the  slowdo~'n  in  bank  lending  co
developing  countries.  In table 2-2 it is also apparent  that FDI flows to
developing  countries  have  declined  considerably  as a percentage  of total  world
FDI  --from  29.5  percen±t  in 1975,  to 23.8  percent  in  1980  and  to  13.7  peicent  in
1988.  The counterpart  to this decline  was a large increase  in FLI in the
industrial  countries,  especially  the United States.  The amoun; of FDI in
relation  to the recipient  developing  countries'  economies  declineJ  uncil  1986
after  peaking  in 1981-82.
Table  2-2.  Relative  Magnitudes  of -D;  Flows  to  All Developing
Countries,  1975-1988
(percentage)
Total  World  Net f.ow  of  GDP  of  Gross  domestic
Year  FDI flows  Finan-ial  developing investment  in
resources  countries  developiong
to developing  countrles
countries
1975  29.5  15.0  0.8  3.0
1976  27.3  10.8  0.5  2.1
1977  25.7  12.2  0.5  1.8
1978  24.0  12.2  0.5  1.8
1979  24.8  13.6  0.5  2.0
1980  23.8  12.8  0.5  1.8
1981  24.6  14.6  0.6  2.3
1982  25.5  14.7  0.6  2.2
1983  21.7  13.7  0.4  1.8
1984  20.0  15.3  0.5  1.8
1985  24.9  20.2  0.5  2.2
1986  14.6  20.9  0.5  2.1
1987  14.3  33.4  0.7  2.9
19888  13.7  --  0.7  2.7
--  Not  available
a. Estimated  figures.
Source:  IMF6
In  table  2-3  it  is  evident  that  the  proportions  of  the  principal  components
of FDI--new  equity,  reinvested  earnings,  and FDI-related  borrowing--have  also
shifted  over time.  The new equity  component  had thus increased  to over 65
percent  of total  FDI  flovs  to  developing  countries  by 1988  -up  from  23 percent
in 1977  and  46  percent  in  1982.9  Meanwhile,  the  proportions  for  both  reinvested
earnings  and FDI-related  borrowing  had  decreased. In 1988  rsinvested  earnings
were  S  percent  and  borrowing  25  percent  of  the  total  flows. There  were important
individual  country  exceptions  to these  trends,  however. For instance,  although
the relative  importance  cf reinvested  earnings  in Brazil  exhibits  substantial
year-to-year  fluctuations,  there  has  not  been the  same  downward  trend  over  the
past decade  that  the  worldwide  data reveal.
Table  2-3:  Components  of FDI  Flows  to  Developing  Countries,  1975-88
(percent)
Reinvested  Long-term  Short-term
Year  Equity  earnings  borrowing  borrowing
1975  27.1  18.3  54.4  0.2
1976  12.9  30.4  59.3  -2.6
1977  23.4  28.1  50.2  -1.6
1918  36.9  29.5  34.5  -0.9
1979  42.0  23.1  39.0  -4.2
1980  52.5  24.7  23.6  -0.8
1981  46.3  19.7  34.6  -0.6
1982  45.5  22.6  30.7  1.2
1963  44.0  15.8  40.9  -0.7
1984  57.5  14.2  26.0  2.3
1985  53.6  17.4  33.3  -4.3
1986  54.3  20.0  26.0  -0.6
1987  62.0  14.5  23.1  0.4
1988  66.7  9.1  24.2  0.4
Nute:  These  are  -:et  figures,  for  example,  new  equity  less  divestment.  See  IMF
(1977),  p.140,  para.  419-20.
Source: IMF.7
Host Countries  and  Regions
FDI  in  the  developing  world  has  consistently  been concentrated  in  a  small
number of  individual  countries.  This was  true in an earlier era, when
investmentd  in the primary  sector  predominated,  and it has also been true in
recent  years,  when  manufacturing  investments  have  been  more  common. Thus,  a  few
economically  large  or upper-middle-income  countries  in Latin  America  and  Asia
have been the principal  recipients,  and the regional  distributions  generally
reflect  these  country  concentration  patterns.
Table 2-4 lists the escimated regional  distributions  of FDI stocks.
In 1960  orn-half  of the  FDI  stock  in  developing  countries  was in  Latin  America,
with slightly  less  than  one-fourth  in  Asia. During  the  1960s  the  share  in  Latin
America  irncreased  and  the  share  in  Asia  decreased,  while  other  regions'  shares
did  not  change  significantly.  Then,  during  the  1970s,  the  Asian  share  increased,
while  the  Latin  American  and  Africarn  shares  decreased--trends  that  continued  in
the 1sOs.
Table  2-4.  FDI  Stocks  by Region  of Host  DevelopLng  Countries,  Selected  Years
(percent  of all  developing  countries)
Rep-ion  1960  1971  1980
Latin  America  48.3  57.6  53.1
Africa  17.0  17.1  10.6
Asia  23.3  15.2  25.8
Middle  East  8.5  6.8  3.5
Europe  2.8  3.3  7.1
Source:  Stopford  and  Dunning  (1983),  as reported  in  OECD (1987),
table  3-2,  p. 187.8
In table  2-5,  where  yearly  flows  are  given,  the  increased  share  going  to
Asian  countries  is  apparent.  By 1985-86  one-third  of  all  FDI  flows  to  developing
countries  was  going  to  Asian  countries.  Among  Latin  American  countries,  Colombia
has been an exception  to the general  decline  in FDI during  the 1980s.  After
several  years of declining  investor  interest  in the  early  1980s,  FDI in  Mexico
increased  substantially  in  the  late  1980s. Overall,  however,  by 1986  the  Latin
American  countries'  share  of FDI flows  had  declined  to 24.6  percent.
Table  2-5.  Foreign  Direct  Investment  Flows  Region  of Host Developing  Countries,
1981-87  (percent  of all  developing  countries)
Region  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
Latin  America  35.5  24.5  21.2  20.4  31.6  24.6  46.4
Africa  7.0  6.9  7.2  6.7  6.4  5.6  5.6
Asia  22.1  17.6  31.0  28.8  37.6  32.8  51.6
Middle  East  31.3  48.1  35.8  38.5  17.3  30.8  -13.8
Europe  4.4  3.0  5.5  5.7  6.8  6.2  10.3
Source: IMF.
Uritil  1989,  FDI in China  had  been increasing  substantially--from  SDR389
million  in 1982 to SDR1,598  million  in 1986 (Pfeffermann  1988).  Elsewhere  in
Asi4,  FDI  flows  have  also increased--in  recent  years  the  Republic  of Korea,  and
in earlier  years  to Malaysia,  Singapore,  and Indonesia  have  received  increased
shares.  As noted in the section  entitled  "Sectoral  Shares,"  the geographic
distribution  trends  for  FDI  are  affected  by  the  large  amounts  of  FDI  in  off-shore
banking  centers  and in flags-of-convenience  shipping.
Source  Countries
There has been a high degree  of concentration  in FDI flows  by source
country  (table  2-6). Five  countries--the  United  States,  United  Kingdom,  Federal
Republic  of  Germany,  France,  and  Japan--have  accounted  for  80  percent  or  more  of
the  total  FDI  flows  to  developing  countries.  The  U.S.  share  had  been  around  40-
60  percent  in  the  late  1970s,  but  declined  in  the  1980s.  In  contrast, Japan's
share  rose  from  10.9  percent  in  1975  to  37.2  percent  in 1987. The  three  European
countries'  individual  and  collective  shares  have fluctuated  from  year to  year,
but exhibited  no strong  trends  over the  1975-87  period.9
Table  2-6.  Home Country  Shares  of FDI  Flows  to Developing  Countries,  1975-87
(percent)
United  United  Fed.  Rep.  France  Japan  Total
Year  States  Kingdom  of  Germany
1975  63.8  5.8  7.2  2.4  10.9  90.0
1976  37.4  10.0  9.2  2.9  22.3  81.9
1977  49.4  12.0  8.6  2.7  11.6  84.3
1978  48.0  7.0  8.8  3.5  17.3  84.7
1979  60.5  5.2  6.2  5.1  10.4  87.3
1980  30.9  17.6  14.5  8.3  15.4  86.6
1981  38.4  13.8  8.0  6.7  23.3  90.3
1982  44.1  10.5  8.0  7.6  18.9  89.1
1983  25.6  16.2  9.2  4.4  19.4  74.8
1984  39.7  18.9  6.3  2.4  15.6  82.9
1985  14.4  32.6  -2.2  9.0  15.5  69.2
1986  27.9  17.1  3.7  5.5  27.8  82.0
1987  40.3  9.5  3.4  3.5  37.2  93.8
Note:  All percentages  are of outflows  from OECD countries  only, not world
totals.
Source: OECD.10
Another development  in the past decade  has been an increase  in FDI
flows  from  developing  countries.  Multinational  firms  from  Brazil,  for  instance,
have undertaken  investments  in the countries of West Africa and in other
developing  areas. Meanwhile,  Brazil  has received  investments  by 1985  from  such
developing  economies  as  Kuwait,  Saudi  Arabia,  South  Africa,  Iran,  Portugal,  and
Hong  Kong--although  they  totalled  less  chan  2  percent  of  Brazil's  the  FDI  stock.
Malaysia, Singapore,  and Hong Kong are unusual among developing
economies  in  the  extent  to  which  they  are  both  recipients  of  and  sources  of  FDI,
which reflects  the intense  activity  in intraregional  FDI in Southeast  Asia. 10
Malaysia  is especially  prominent  for the  high  proportion  of FDI that  has come
from other developing  countries  as of 1983, 44 percent of its FDI stock in
"pioneer  industries"  was from non-OECD  countries,  inctluding  33 percent from
Singapore. Five  Asian  developing  countries  exhibit  relatively  high  proportions
of FDI  stocks  from  other  developing  countries:  Thailand,  17.6  percent  in 1984;
India,  13.2  percent  in 1974;  Indonesia,  at least  9.6  percent  in 1983;  and the
Republic  of Korea,  close  to  9  percent  in 1986.  In three  of the  Latin  American
countries,  the  comparable  figures  were  generally  less  than  5  percent.  (There  are
no directly  comparable  data  for  Argentina,  Nigeria,  or  Kenya.) Table  2-7  lists
additional  data  on FDI;  those  data  indicate  FDI  flows  from  developing  countries
were  usually  about  I.D  percent  of  world  totals. Three-fourths  of the  outflows
were from  Latin  American  countries. 11
Table  2-7.  FDI  Flows  from  Developing  Countries,  1975-87
Year  SDRs (millions)  Percent  of total
world  FDI
1975  181  1.0
1976  313  2.1
1977  310  1.4
1978  299  1.2
1979  332  1.0
1980  485  1.3
1981  325  0.6
1982  1,057  2.2
1983  721  1.6
1984  448  0.9
1985  1,101  2.4
1986  938  1.5
1987  1,223  1.5
1988  1,159  1.2
Source:  IMF.11
It  should  also  be  noted  that  the  centrally  planned  economy  and  Council
for  Mutual Economic  Assistance  (CPE-COMECON)  countries  of Eastern  Europe  are
source  countries  of FDI  in  developing  countries--although  at relatively  modest
levels  (McMillan  1987,  pp.33-46). In 1983 there  were  at least  213  COMECON  FDI
projects  in  75 developing  countries,  including  Mexico,  India,  and  Nigeria,  with
a disproportionate  number in Africa.  The total  stock  of these investments,
however,  has  been  estimated  at  only  $1  billion  to $2  billion  (out  of  a  worldwide
total COMECON FDI stock of approximately  $4 billion to $6 billion in 1983)
(McMillan  1987,  p.40). This  compares  with a total  FDI  stock  in  all  developing
countries  from  all  sources  of approximately  $200  billion. 11
In addition to the FDI from the state enterprises  of the COMECON
countries,  there  is  also  outward  FDI  by the  state  economic  enterprises  (SEEs)  of
developed  and  developina  countries. Unfortunately,  the  readily  available  data
on FDI flows  and stocks  do not separate  the portion  of FDI from SEEs in the
developed  or  developing  countries,  but  the  share  of  FDI  in  developing  countries
controlled  by home  country  SEEs  is low.
Sectoral  Shares
A sectoral  analysis  of  the  shares  of FDI  must  be qualified  by the  data's
limitations.  Nevertheless,  some  patterns  and  trends  can  be  observed  in  the  data
presented  in  tables  2-7  and  2-8. Although  these  data  do  not  extend  back  far  into
the past, it is well known that FDI in manufacturing  began to increase  in
importance  compared  with  the  earlier  emphasis  on  FDI  in  the  primary  sector  before
the 1970s  (table  2-8)."
Table  2-8.  Sectoral  Shares  of FDI  Stock  in  All  Developing  Countries,
Selected  Years
(percent)
Sector  1971  1975  1978  1982
Extractive  22.9  26.7  12.8  22.6
Manufacturing  59.0  53.2  64.5  54.1
Services  18.1  20.1  22.7  23.3
Source: Dunning  and  Cantwell,  (1987),  table  B2,  p. 793,
and table  B3,  p.795  for  1975  and 1982  respectively;  Stopford
and  Dunning  (1983),  as reported  in  OECD,  International
Investment  and  Multinational  EnterRrises (1987)  table  3-12
on p. 197,  for  1971  and 1978.12
Within  the  manufacturing  sector  there  was  an  important  shift  that  is  not
revealed  by the  data  in  those  tables  but  that  has  been  frequently  noted  (see,  for
example,  OECD  1987,  pp. 38-40). Manufacturing  FDI  was  strongly  oriented  toward
import  substitution  projects  for rapidly  growing  markets,  especially  in Latin
America,  until  the  1970s. Starting  in the  1970s  and  continuing  into  the  1980s,
however, the emphasis  in manufacturing  FDI shifted to low production  cost,
export-oriented  projects. This  shift  in  corporations'  strategic  emphasis  within
manufacturing  goes hand-in-hand  with  the regional shift noted  above--the
decreasing  proportions  of  FDI  in  Latin  America  and  the  increasing  amount  in  Asia.
At the same time,  the share of FDI in services  increased  from 20.1
percent  in 1975  to 23.3  percent  in 1982. This increase  in the  share  of FDI in
services,  is  highly  concentrated  in  the  financial  services  industry,  especially
in offshore  centers.
Several  of these patterns  and trends  are evident in some detail  iti
table  2-9,  where increases  in U.S. and  Japanese  direct  investments  are  broken
down  by sector  and  by region. The  large  increases  in  FDI  in  services  by  both  the
United  States  and  Japan,  for  instance,  can  be noted-  -as  can  the  large  amounts  of
U.S. investment  in  offshore  financial  centers.13
Table  2-9.  Increases  in  outward  YDI  Stock  fro  the  Ubited  Statea  and  Japan  by Sector  sad  Raglen,  1977-85
(U$8  billions,  increase  from  1977  to  1985)
All
Latin  Offshore  Middle  developing
Amorica  Centers'  Asia  Africa  East  countries
UNITED  S_iATES
Primary'  2.3  0.6  4.3  2.7  7.1  17.1
Manufacturing  5.3  0.4  2.0  0.1  0.3  8.2
Servicesa  1.7  12.7  3.1  0.1  1.0  17.8
Banking  0.4  3.8  0.9  0.2  0.2  5.4
Financial  insurance
real  estate  0.8  8.5  0.6  -0.1  -0.1  9.8
Whole&ale  trading  0.3  0.5  1.3  0.0  0.5  2.6
All industries  9.3  13.7  9.4  2.9  8.4  43.1
JAPAN
Primary'  1.0  n.a.  4.8  0.2  0.2  5.2
Manufacturing  2.5  n.a.  5.5  0.1  0.8  8.5
Servicesd  8.3  n.a.  5.5  2.1  -0.2  14.3
Financial  and
insurance  1.5  n.a.  0.9  0.0  0.1  2.1
Real  estate  0.0  n.a.  0.4  0.0  -0.4  -0.1
Trading  0.8  n.a.  1.4  0.0  0.0  1.7
All industries  11.9  n.a.  16.0  2.5  1.5  28.9
n.a.  Not available.
a.  Bahamas,  Bermuda,  Panama,  Trinidad  and  Tobago,  and  other  Caribbean  islands.
b.  Asia  and  Pacific  for  United  States,  Asia  plus  Oceans  for  Japan.
c.  Includes  petroleum,  mining,  forestry,  agriculture  and  fishing.  For  U.S.  figures  for  Latin  America  and
offshore  centers,  one-half  of the "other  industries"  plus  "other  services"  sum  has  been allocated  to
the  primary  sector.
d.  Services  totals  do  not  equal  sums of  the  subtotals  for  the  more  refined  industry  grouping  because  some
subtotals  have  been  omitted.  The  services  totals  were  computed  by  subtracting  the  primary  and
manufactuing  sectors  from  the  overall  totals  for  the  United  States  in  order  to correct for its
contamination  by  some  primary-sector  projects  in  the  source  tables.
Source: United  Nations  Centre  on Transnational  Corporations  (1988),  annex  tables  C-1 and  C-2,  p.  589.  Some
lines  in  the  source  tables  have  been  aggregated  and  others  deleted  to  simplify  the  present  presentation.14
Chapter  3
Patterns  and  Trends  in Eleven  Host  Countries
The eleven  countries  selected  for the studies  in Becsky,  Lee, and  Ordu
(1990) include  many of the principal  FDI host countries,  including  Brazil,
Malaysia,  and  Mexico. Collectively,  these  eleven  countries  accounted  for  more
thar.  half  of the  FDI inflows  into  all  developing  countries  in  each  of the  years
from 1975 through 1983; from 1984 through 1988 they accounted for nearly
one-half,  as indicated  in table  3-1.
Table  3-1.  Eleven  Host  Coumtries'  Share  of  FDI  FlOws  to  A11  DeveOLping  Csmntries.  1975-88
(percent)
Country  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981 1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988
Argentina  n.a.  n.a.  2.2  3.2  1.9  6.1  5.4  1.7  1.8  2.6  7.5  5.3  -0.1  6.2
Brazil  21.0  32.6  28.1  25.7  22.7  17.1  16.5  22.1  15.2  15.8  11.2  3.0  8.0  0.0
Colombia  0.6  0.5  1.0  1.4  1.2  1.4  1.7  2.8  6.0  5.8  8.4  6.2  2.1  1.2
Mexico  9.8  13.2  8.5  10.7  12.5  19.2  18.6  12.4  4.4  3.9  4.1  14.0  21.1  14.0
India  1.6  1.2  -0.7  0.3  0.6  0.9  0.7  0.6  0.1  0.2  0.9  1.3  1.3  1.3
Indonesia  7.7  7.2  3.7  3.6  2.1  1.6  0.9  1.7  2.8  2.2  2.5  2.4  2.9  2.9
Korea.
Rep.  of  0.9  1.7  1.4  1.2  0.3  0.1  0.7  0.5  0.7  1.1  2.0  3.9  3.9  4.7
4Malaysia 5.7  8.0  6.2  6.4  5.4  8.3  8.3  10.6  12.3  7.9  5.7  4.5  2.8  3.5
Thailand  0.4  1.7  1.6  0.7  0.5  1.7  1.9  1.5  3.4  4.0  1.3  2.4  2.3  6.0
Kenya  0.3  1.0  0.9  0.4  0.8  0.7  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.4  0.1
Nigeria  6.7  7.1  6.8  2.7  2.9  -6.6  3.6  3.2  3.4  1.9  3.9  1.8  3.9  4.5
TC'AI.  52.9  72.9  60.3  56.1  50.4  49.5  57.7  56.6  50.3  45.2  46.6  44.0  47.3  43.2
n.a.  not avaiLable
Source:  IMP.15
The patterns  and trends  in FDI in these  eleven  countries  inevitably
reflect  the  same  dynamics  at the  global  and  regional  levels,  but  the  differences
in the  patterns  and trends  in FDI  among  the  countries  are  at least  as striking
as  the  similarities.  Indeed,  the  relative  ltt',  pendence  of  FDI  flows  among  these
eleven  countries  is  apparent  in  weak  correlations  in  FDI  flows  for  each  pair  of
countries;  even  the  intra-regional  country-pair  correlations  are  generally  weak.
Neither at the global level nor within regions do FDI flows to developing
countries  fluctuate  in synchrony;  rather,  each host country's  experience  is
relatively  autonomous.
Individual  Country  Trends
Time series  data in  constant  U.S. dollars  for  FDI  flows  to  the  eleven
countries  are displayed  in charts  3-1 to 3_3.14 Among the eleven  countries,
Brazil  is  unique  in the  pattern  of substantial  increases  into  the  early  1970s,
relatively  high  levels  into  the  early-1980s,  and  precipitous  decreases  since  the
early  1980s. In  the  other  Latin  American  countries  the  large  fluctuations  in  the
early and mid-1980s are  the most obvious similarity across the  selected
countries. In  Colombia  the  surge  of  FDI  in  the  early  to  mid-1980s  is  conspicuous
among the eleven  countries  in the -agree  of its deviation  from an otherwise
stable  and  relatively  low-level  pattern  over  the  two  decades  from  the  late  1960s
to the  late 1980s. Average  annual  flows  were  greater  at the  end  of the  period
than at the beginning  for  Argentina,  Colombia,  and Mexico;  nevertheless,  the
year-to-year  fluctuations  around  the  relatively  high  levels  in  the  1980s  were  so
great  compared  with the earlier  years  that one cannot  be confident  about  any
generalized  description  of a long-term  trend.16
Chart  3-1. ID!  Flown  in  Four  Latin  American  Countries
(in  US$  billions)
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Among  the  five  Asian  countries  over  the  twenty-year  period,  there  was  a  general
trend  of increasing  flows,  but there  were  significant  positive  and  negative
deviations  from  this  basic  trend  in  each  country. Furthermore,  each  country
graph  reveals  a distinctive  profile  over time.  Except  for  a large  dip in
1973-74,  Indonesia  experietLced  increasing  flows  from  the  late  1960s  to  the  mid-
1970s,  and relative  stability  since.  India  experienced  overall  low  levels
throughout  the  period.  FDI  flows  into  Korea  were  relatively  stable  at  low  levels
but then increased  over the 1984-87  period.  Malaysia  and Thailand  both
experienced  relatively  large  magnitudes  of  inflows  in  1974  and  again  in  the  early
1980s  (1982  was  a  peak  year  for  Malaysia  and  1984  for  Thailand).17
Chart  3-2- FDI  Flows  in  FLvy  Asian  Countries
(in  US$  billions)
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Reflecting  the  record  of  other  African  countries,  Kenya  and  Nigeria
were  experiencing  lower  levels  of  FDI  inflows  (in  constant  dollars)  at  the  end
of  the  1980s  than  at  the  beginning;  the  basic  trend  for  Nigeria  has  been  one  of
decline  for  the  two-decade  perlod,  while  Kenya  experienced  a :'ositive  though
moderate  inflow  throughout  the perlod. Whereas  Kenya's  inflows  reveal  no
volatility,  Nigeria  experienced  a  large  but  brief  negative  deviation  in  1980.1518
Chart  3-3. FDI  Flows  in  Two  African  Countries
(in  US$  millions)
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Summary  data  on  the  long-term  trends  and  year-to-year  fluctuations  in
those  trends  are  presented  in  table  3-2,  based  on  linear  regressions  for  each  of
the  eleven  countrles.  The  differences  across  the  countries  in  the  long-term
trends,  as indicated  by the slope  coefficients,  are apparent. Argentina,
Colombia,  and  Malaysia  experienced  annual  increases  (indicated  by the  slope)
exceeding  10  percent  of  their  mean  FDI  flows  for  the  period,  but  the  comparable
figures  for  the  other  countries  were  quite  low. Even  more  pronounced,  however,
is  the  degree  of departure  from  the  trend  of the  annual  flows  to individual
countries,  as  indicated  by  the  (small)  R-squares.19
Table  3-2. Time-Series  Regressions  of FDI  Flows
for  Eleven  Host Countries,  1968-87
Country  Slope  Coefficient  of  Slope  as  percent
coefficient  (b)e  (R 2)  average  EDI__
Argentina  +0.029  .31  11.6
Brazil  +0.002  .00  0.1
Colombia  +0.030  .41  12.5
Mexico  +0.044  .14  3.7
India  +0.001  .01  1.0
Indonesia  +0.003  .01  1.2
Korea,  Rep. of  +0.004  .05  3.6
Malaysia  +0.037  .35  17.3
Thailand  +0.006  .13  3.3
Kenya  -0.001  .04  -3.3
Nigeria  -0.029  .26  -6.9
a. Billions  of constant  1980  U.S.  dollars  a  year.
Sectoral  Concentration
The eleven  hbst countries  also vary in the degree  of concentration
within sectors (table  3-4).  Brazil and Mexico are notable for their  high
proportions  (three-fourths)  of FDI in the secondary  sector,  and Indonesla  and
Colombia  are  notable  for  having  60  percent  or  more of their  FDI in the  primary
sector,  mostly  in  oil  and  gas. Korea,  Malaysia,  and  Nigeria  stand  out  for  their
relatively  large  proportion  of  FDI  in  services.  By 1986,  40.2  percent  of  Korea's
FDI stock was in the tertiary  sector--including  27.4 percent in hotels (in
anticipation  of  the  Olympic  games  in  1988i)  and  7.1  percent  in  banking  and  finance
(following  liberalization  of  banking  regulations);  furthermore,  FDI  in  insurance
is  expected  to increase  as  a result  of li6eralization  of restrictions  on  FDI  in
that  industry.
Malaysia  and Nigeria,  exhibit  an unusual  degree  of diversification,
with  substantial  proportions  of  their  FDI  stock  in  each  of the  sectors. Such  a
diversification  of FDI  across  sectors  is advantageous  to a  given  host country
because  it mitigates  cyclical  fluctuations  associated  with individual  sectors,
especially  the  primary  sector.20
table  3-s.  Becteral  Distribution  of FDI  Stoeka  in 8l1vme  Host  Countries
(percent  of  total)
Country  Primary  Secondary  TertiAryX  Yea
Argentina  27.4  48.3  23.3t  1976-83
Brazil  13.5  74.7  19.2  1985
Colombia  61.0f  29.0'  10.0'  1985
Mexicod  n.a.  76.0  n.a.  1984
India  15.8  55.2  29.0  1974
Indonesia  62.5  n.a.  n.a.  1983
Korea,  Rep.  of  0.7  59.2  40.2  1986
Malaysia  26.9  33.5  39.Ob  1972-81
Thailand'  n.a.  33.0'  n.a.  1984
Kenya  3.1  64.3  32 . 6 b  1985
Nigeria  28.4  30.1  41.5b  1986
a.a.  Not  Available.
Note:  Figures  do  not add  to 100.0  for  some  countries  because  of  unclassified  projects,  imprecise  estimiates,  or
rounding.
a.  Latest  year  available  in  Becsky,  Lee,  and  Ordu  (1990).  Where  multiple  years  are  shown,  the  stocks
are  based  on the cumulative  flows  for the  indicated  years  only.
b.  Estimates  computed  from  figures  for  other  sectors  or  computed  from  estimates  in  original  source.
c.  Rounded  estimates  in  Becsky,  Lee,  and  Ordu (1990).
d.  The  76 percent  figure  for  Mexico  is  based  on the  country  study  estimate.  of  74-;_  percent  depending
on  the  year.  The  latest  year  for  the  sectoral  distribution  is 1984.
e.  The  Indonesia  country  study  estimates  "nearly  10  billion"  in  energy  out  of  a  total  of  "nearly  16
billion".
f.  The  Thailand  country  study  estimates  "one-third"  in  manufacturing.
Sgogre:  Becsky,  Lee,  and  Ordu  (1990).  tables  2-6,  3-5,  4-3,  5-22,  6-9,  7-4,  and  7-7.21
Source  Country  Goncentration
Over time, as FDI accumulates,  a single  source  country  may come to
dominate  the  stock  of  FDI  in  a  given  recipient  country.  A relatively  high  degree
of source-country  concentration  can  create  greater  nationalistic  sensitivities
about  FDI  and  vulnerability  to  shifts  in  the  FDI  policies  of  the  home  governments
and  corporations.  Among  the  eleven  countries,  there  is  considerable  variance  in
the  source-country  concentration  ratios  presented  in  table  3-5.  Four of the
host countries  exhibit  ratios  of 60 percent  or more:  Kenya,  where  the  British
colonial  legacy  is  still  apparent; Colombia  and  Mexico,  where  the  proximity  to
the United States is a factor;  and Indonesia,  where proximity to Japan is
significant.  The  concentration  ratios  exceed  50  percent  for  two  other  countries-
-Nigeria  (United  Kingdom,  54.5  percent)  and  Korea  (Japan,  54.9  percent).
Table  3-4.  Source  Country  FDI  Stock  Concentration  Ratios
in Eleven  Host  Countries
Host  Source
country  Perceng  Country  Yeara
Argentina  39.7  U.S.  1976
Brazil  31.4  U.S.  1985
Colombia  67.0b  U.S.  1986
Mexico  66.0  U.S.  1984
Indonesiac  60.0  Japan  1983
Korea,  Rep.  of  54.9  Japan  1986
Malaysia  n.a. 0 Singapore  1987
Thailand  30.2  U.S.  1984
Kenya  67.0  U.K  1972
Nigeria  54.5  U.K.  1986
n.a.  Not available
a. Latest  year available  in Becsky,  Lee,  and  Ordu (1990).
b. Rounded  to nearest  percent  in original  source.
c.  Based  on  U.K. figure  for  1987  (estimated)  against  total  for  1984  in  original
table,  Singapore's  share  would  be greater  than  18.5  percent.
d. Estimates  from  the  country  study  for  total  FDI.  Smaller  estimates  of 42.1
percent  and  48.2  percent  in  Table  5.5  are for  BKPM  jurisdiction  FDI  projects
only.  Using  data in  Table  5.3,  the  figure  would  be 54.3  percent.
Source:  Becsky,  Lee, and  Ordu (1990),  tables  2-7,  3-6,  3-11,  3-15,  4-4,  5-7,
5-11,  6-4, 6-8,  7-5,  and 7-11.22
Chapter  4
Host  Country  Economic  and  Political  Environment
Macroeconomic  and  political  conditions  are  the  most important  host-country
variables  affecting  investors'  FDI 0-cisions.  Because  host-country  economic
conditions  affect  FDI projects  in the same  way that they affect  domestically
owned  projects,  a  broad  range  of  host-country  economic  policies  is  pertinent  to
foreign  direct investors'  operations. Some policies,  such as wage and  price
controls,  have  direct  effects  on  FDI  projects; other  policies,  such  as  monetary
and fiscal  policies,  can  have important  indirect  effects.
The eleven selected  host countries  have varied substantially  in their
approach to such economic  policies and in their responses  to external  and
internal  shocks. Whereas  some  countries  have  been inclined  to  alter  government
policies  in response  to changing  circumstances  and to allow  market  forces  to
operate in the balance of payments  adjustment  process,  others  have pursued
government  policies  that  constrain  the  adjustment  process,  at  least  in  the  short
term. Yet, whatever  the  vicissitudes  of  macroeconomic  conditions  and  policies,
one  ever-present  key determinant  of FDI  is  host-country  economic  size.
Size  of Economy
Numerous  studies  of FDI  have  found  that  aggregate  national  market  size,  as
indicated  by  host country  GNP  or GDP,  is  related  to  variations  across  countries
in the  levels of FDI  inflows (Scaperlanda  and Hauer 1969; Kobrin 1976).
Similarly,  a  pooled  time-series,  cross-sectional  regression  of FDI  flows  on GDP
for the eleven selected  countries  over the 1968-87  period  found them to be
positively  related (and statistically  significant  at the .001 level).  The
relationship  of variations  among  countries  in the level  of FDI flows  to host-
country  economic  size  is also  demonstrated in  table  4-1.
Real growth  rates  in  GDP  have  been found  to  be correlates  of FDI  flows  by
some  studies  (Root  and  Ahmed  1978),  furthermore,  economic  stability,  as  measured
by the  inflation  rate,  can  be an important  variable  in  the  host-country  economic
environment. A pooled  time-series,  cross-sectional  multiple  regression  of FDI
flows  on  GDP,  growth  rates,  and  inflation  rates  for  these  eleven  countries  during
1968-87  period  was therefore  undertaken;  it reveals  an R-square  of only 0.11.
Furthermore,  neither  GDP  growth  rate  nor  inflation  rate  was  significantly  related
to  FDI  flows  at the .05  level  (although,  again,  GDP  was  significantly  related  to
FDI).  The relationship  of FDI to economic  growth and price stability  may
therefore  be  more complex  than  previously  thought  and  involve  lags  over  time  and
differences  across  countries  that  are  difficult  to  capture  without  more  complex
econometric  models.23
Table  4-1.  GDP  and FDI  For  Eleven  Host  Countries,  1978-87
(annual  average)
1980  U.S.  dollars  (billions)  Rank
Country  DGEP  E  GDP
Argentina  0.25  49.9  6  7
Brazil  1.67  191.4  1  1
Colombia  0.24  29.4  7  8
Mexico  1.19  160.7  2  3
India  0.07  167.2  10  2
Indonesia  0.85  65.7  3  5
Korea,  Rep. of  0.12  57.6  9  6
Malaysia  0.64  21.1  4  10
Thailand  0.18  28.6  8  9
Kenya  0.03  6.1  11  11
Nigeria  0.42  84.0  5  4
Source: IFS;  IMF  data  are  not  reported  for  India  in  Becsky,  Lee,  and  Ordu  (1990;
table  4-2).  Nevertheless,  the  OECD figures  reported  there  and the IMF  figures
reported  here  are  identical  for  thirteen  of  the  eighteen  years  (1968-85)  reported
in table  4-2.  For the  eighteen  year  period,  the IMF figures  averaged  0.008  a
year more than  the  OECD figures. Indonesia's  figures  are  based  on a composite
of  IMF  and  OECD  figures  for  1968-86;  see  table  5-3  Becsky,  Lee,  and  Ordu  (1990).
Korea's  figures  are  from  the  Finance  Ministry  for  1968-86;  the  0.  12  reported  here
compares  with  the  IFS  average  of 0.11  for  1968-87.  See  table  6-6  in  Becsky,  Lee,
and  Ordu (1990).
In table 4-2 the ratios  of FDI flows to GDP for each of the eleven
countries  are presented  for  each five-year  period  from  1968 to 1987. Although
those  numbers  are  inevitably  small,  they  nevertheless  indicate  the  extent  of the
deviation  in  FDI  flows  for  individual  countries  and  time  periods  from  what  would
be expected on the basis of the economic size of the host country alone.
Malaysia,  at one  extreme,  and  India,  at the  other,  are  notable  for  the  extent  to
which their  FDI-GDP  ratios  differ  from the  mean of 0.4  percent  for the  group
over  the  twenty-year  period. Malaysia's  FDI  inflows  were  consistently  far  above
and India's far below what would be expected  solely  on the basis of their
economic  size. Many countries  exhibit  stability  in  the  relative  sizes  of their
ratios  over  time,  but  others  experienced  significant  changes  in  their  ratios  over
the  twenty-year  period. Kenya's  and  Nigeria's  ratios,  in  particular,  were  both
quite  high  for  the  1968-72  period  before  declining,  while  Brazil's  decreased  and
Colombia's  increased  significantly  by the  1983-1987  period. The  ratio  for  Korea
was surprisingly  low  throughout  the  twenty-year  period,  as FDI  increases  barely
kept  pace  with  GDP growth. Following  Japan's  example,  Korea  discouraged  FDI  in
manufacturing  sector  until  the  1980s.24
There are, of course, important factors in addition to host-country
economic  size  that  affect  FDI  flows. The  balance  of this  chapter  considers  the
role  of  additional  economic  factors  and  the  general  political  environment  of the
host country as influences  on FDI flows.  The next chapter considers  more
specifically  and  narrowly  the  FDI  policies  of the  host countries,  and  chapter  6
considers  the  policies  of  home  governments  and  international  institutions  as  they
bear directly  on FDI in  developing  countries.
Table  4-2.  Ratio  of FDI  Flows  to GDP  for  Eleven  Host Countries
(percent)
Country  1968-72  1I271ZZ  1928-82  1283-87
Argentina  0.1  0.1  1.0  0.8
Brazil  1.0  1.3  1.0  0.4
Colombia  0.6  0.2  0.5  1.6
Mexico  0.8  0.7  0.9  0.5
India'  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Indonesia  1.5  2.4  1.4  0.3
Korea  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2
Malaysia  2.1  3.6  4.0  2.3
Thailand  0.9  0.7  0.5  0.6
Kenya  1.0  0.6  0.6  0.2
Nigeria  1.1  0.7  0.2  0.3
a.  India  varied  between  0.01  and  0.04  percent.
Sources: See  table  4-1.
Economic  Policies
A  broad  spectrum  of  host-country  economic  policies  is  inevitably  of  concern
to foreign  direct  investors. All  of the  usual  domestic  economic  policies  that
affect  businesspeople's  calculations  of expected  returns  and  risk  pertain,  but
foreign  direct  investors  are  also  concerned  about  host  countries'  international
economic  policies. Perhaps  above  all  else,  investors  desire  as much stability
in economic  policy  as is practicable, but they also  want  economic  adjustment
processes  to  be allowed  to operate  with  minimal  government  intervention.
Thus, for instance,  they  want exchange  rates  and interest  rates to be
allowed  to  adjust  to  changing  inflation  rates. If  exchange  rates,  in  particular,
are  not  allowed  to  reflect  cross-national  differences  in  inflation  rates,  foreign
direct  investors  (as  well  as  other  businesses)  are  exposed  to  price  distortions
in their costs and revenues that can threaten their long-run  competitive
position.  Althcough  investors  prefer  stable  exchange  rates  in  the  short  run,  then'
do not  want exchange  rates  to be inflexible  and  insensitive  to  basic  price  and
income  forces  in the  long  run.25
Investors  may enjoy  the  benefits  of  low  subsidized  interest  rates  for  their
own  projects,  but  they  want  interest  rates  in  general  to  reflect  inflation  rates,
and  thus  be  positive  in  real  terms. Otherwise,  low  domestic  investment  rates  and
capital  flight  can  contribute  to  a  deteriorating  domestic  economy  and  balance  of
payments  position.
In order to gain a more refined  understanding  of the effects  of host-
country  economic  conditions  and  policies  on  PDI,  further  distinctions  about  the
different  kinds  of FDI  projects  need  to  be made.  In  both the  manufacturing  and
services  sectors,  although  market  size  is  a  function  of  national  incomes,  changes
in the distribution  of income  among  regions  within  a country  and among other
socioeconomic  groups  can also affect the attractiveness  of a host country's
market. A less  unequally  distributed  national  income,  and  thus  an increasingly
large  middle-income  group,  for  instance,  or  migration  irom  rural  to  urban  areas,
can  make a given  market  more  attractive  for  some  products.
For all manufacturing  FDI projects--and  especially  those based on an
efficiency-seeking  strategy--the  effects  of  host-country  economic  conditions  on
the  firms'  costs  are  a central  concern  for  investors. 1 6 Thus,  inflation  rates,
foreign  exchange  rates,  wage rates,  national  savings  and investment  rates,  and
all other  economic  conditions  that  bear on a  project's  costs  are potentially
important.  Policies  leading  to import  protection  and export  promotion  also
matter  for  FDI. The  host-country  corporate  tax  level,  for  instance, was found
to be  significantly  correlated  with manufacturing  FDI  flows to forty-one
developing  countries  during  1966-70  (Root  and  Ahmed  1978). In  recent  years  cost
considerations  have  become  particularly  important  as  firms  have  restructured  and
further  diversified  and integrated  their  production  operations  internationally
in response  to competitive  pressures.
In service  industries,  particularly  in the  past,  many FDI projects  were
undertaken by  corporations that  followed  their  home-country corporate
manufacturing  clients  into  developing  countries. Thus,  direct  investments  were
made  in  financial  services,  accounting  services,  and  consulting  services  so  that
corporations  could  better  serve  (and  thus  retain  the  business  of)  their  corporate
customers  as these  customers  undertook  their  own  FDI  projects. To the extent
that  the  business  of the  corporate  clients  of the  service  industries  depends  on
host-country  economic  conditions,  the  service  corporations'  interests  are also
dependent  (indirectly)  on  those  same  conditions.  This  indirect  dependence  of  the
service  industries  on host-country  economic  conditions  will continue in the
future  because  many service  indutstry  FDI  projects  are  still  primarily  designed
to serve home-country  based corporate  clients.  In addition,  however, many
service  industry  FDI projects  in the future  will serve the  local  host-country
market so that host-country  economic  conditions  will become more directly
relevant. The  prevalence  of this  occurrence  will depend  on the  extent  to  which
the  service  sector  is  made more  open to FDI  through  multilateral  and  bilateral
negotiations.26
For  resource-seeking  investments,  of  course,  the  host-country  endowment  in
the  relevant  natural  resource  is  the  most  important  feature  attracting  investors,
although  even in those  instances  investors  are  not likely  to be oblivious  to
economic  conditions  in  the  host  country  if  there  is  more  than  one  potential  site
for  their  extractive  operations.  As FDI  in  the  primary  mineral  and  agricultural
sectors  has declined  in relative  importance,  and FDI in the  manufacturing  and
services  sectors  has increased  in relative  importance,  host country  economic
conditions  have become  more significant.
The  precise  effects  of  economic  conditions,  furthermore,  greatly  depend  on
the  particular  features  of specific  FDI  projects. A  project  that  imports  a  high
proportion  of its  raw  materials  and  components  and  exports  a  high  proportion  of
its  products  will  obviously  experience  a  relatively  strong  and  direct  impact  from
changes  in foreign  exchange  rates. A  project  that  has a  high  proportion  of its
production  costs  in local  labor  and  sells  a  high proportion  of its  products  in
the  local  market  will be affected  strongly  by wage and  price  controls. In any
case,  the  relationship  between exchange rate  changes and  cross-national
differentials  in inflation  rates  can,  of course,  be crucial.
Economic  conditions  in  neighlboring  countries  can  also  be important-  -as  the
experience  of  Malaysia  demonstrates.  During  the  period  from  the  late  1960s  until
the early 1980s,  when FDI in Malaysia  increased  substantially,  the economic
growth  in  nearby  Singapore  and  Hong  Kong  was  a  major  driving  force. By the  mid-
1980s,  approximately  half of the FDI in Malaysia  had come from these two
neighboring  economies. In  addition  to the  relatively  rapid  economic  expansion
in Singapore  and Hong Kong that accounted  for the FDI flows into Malaysia,
however,  the  relatively  low  wage rates  itl  Malaysia  compared  with the  other  two
economies  played  an important  role.  This  combination  of growth  in  neighboring
countries  and low wages in Malaysia  also accounts  for many of the Japanese,
British,  and  American  investments  in  manufacturing. (In  addition  to the  surge
in manufacturing  FDI  in Malaysia, there have been Japanese and American
investments  in oil and liquefied  natural  gas  in recent  years,  and there is a
continuing  British  presence  in agriculture.)
Political  Stabilitv
Investors'  costs  and  revenues  are  not  only  affected  by  economic  conditions,
they  are  also  dependent  on  political  conditions,  including  the  stability  of the
political  system. Among  the  eleven  selected  countries,  the  effects  of  political
instability  on FDI  can  be demonstrated  in  two  ways.  First,  and  most important,
there  are  countries  such  as  Argentina,  whose  history  has  been  marked  by chronic
political  instability  that deterred  many investors  from undertaking  projects.
Particularly  in the case of Argentina,  the changes in regimes (which  have
sometimes  occurred  through  irregular  means and have sometimes  entailed  major
shifts in government  ideology)  have been accompanied  by instability  in FDI
regulations  and  macroeconomic  policy  (Becsky,  Lee,  and  Ordu 1990, Brewer  1986;
Brewer  1985).27
Second,  brief  periods  of  government  instability  can  cause  interruptions  in
FDI  flows  as investors  "wait  for  the  political  dust  to settle.' For  instance,
in the late 1970s,  Kenya,  which is widely  perceived  as a relatively  stable
political  environment  for  FDI,  suffered  a 'hiatus  of FDI  that  resulted  from  the
death  of Jomo  Kenyatta  [and]  did  not  end  until  late  1979,  following  Arap  Moils
election  as  president"  (Becsky,  Lee,  and  Ordu  1990,  chapter  7). Even  quite  brief
and  transient interludes  of instability  can lead to cancellations  of FDI
projects,  not  merely  their  deferral,  because  investors  sometimes  react  strongly
to the slightest  hint of instability  (Brewer,  David,  and Lim 1985,  p.217). A
different  kind  of instability--civil  war--led  to  declines  in  FDI in  Nigeria  in
the  1960s.
Several  studies  have  tried  to  determine  empirically  the  role  of  instability
in investors'  decisions  about FDI projecta  on the basis of systematically
collected  data.  The studies  have generally  been of two  kinds--those  based  on
executives'  answers to survey  questions  in interviews  and questionnaires  and
those  based  on events  and  FDI  data.  The studies  based  on surveys  consistently
find that  executives  consider  perceived  host-country  instability  to  be a major
deterrent  in  FDI  project  location  decisions  (for  example,  Green  1972;  Root  1968;
Frank  1980,  especially  pp.111-12).
Other  studies  have  also  found  significant  effects  of  political  instability
on  FDI flows.  For  instance, a  study of  foreign direct investments  in
manufacturing  in twenty-four  countries,  including  eleven  developing  countries,
over the period  from 1954 to 1975  by multinational  corporations  based in the
United States was conducted to determine  the relationship  between FDI and
political  conflict  (Nigh  1985).  For  the  developing  countries  in  particular,  the
study  found  that  FDI  flows  were  related  to indicators  of internal  conflict  such
as riots  and  civil  war;  this  was  true  for  lags  of zero to two  years.
To the  extent  that  political  instability  affects  investors'  perceptions  of
host-country  conditions,  and  thus  increases  their  uncertainties  about  the  future
environment  for FDI, political  instability  can be a serious  deterrent  to FDI
inflows.  In addition, some forms of political instability  can  lead to
instability  in specific  government  policies  that  directly  affect  FDI  projects.
There is some evidence,  however,  that in this respect  host-country  political
instability  may not be as problematic  as many investors  believe.  A study  of
governmental  instability  in developing  countries  found it to be only weakly
related  to instability  in their  restrictions  on international  funds  transfers
associated  with FDI projects, and less so than among developed countries
(Brewer  1983).
Instability  in host countries  therefore  does not necessarily  create  an
intolerable  environment  for  successful  FDI  projects.  There  are  many  combinations
of  stability  and  instability,  which  vary  considerably  in  how  problematic  they  are
for  FDI.  Some  instances  of  host-country  instability  can  be detrimental  to the
interests  of FDI projects;  other  instances  of host-country  instability  have
relatively  little  bearing  on FDI  projects.
Another  point  that  investors  should  keep  in  mind  in  their  assumptions  about28
political  instability  is  that  developing  countries  are  not  uniformly  less  stable
than industrial  countries.  Among the industrial  countries,  both France  and
Italy, for  instance,  have had periods of relatively frequent changes in
governments.  The  U.S. political system has  also  exhibited elements of
instability,  with numerous assassinations  and attempted assassinations  of
presidents  and  other  national  political  figures  since  the  mid-1960s. During  the
past  decade  there  have  also  been  unprecedented  and  largely  unanticipated  changes
in the  regulatory  and  tax  environments  affecting  business. Finally,  there  has
been  a  significant  shift  in  the  U.S.  trade  balance,  as  well  as the  international
investment  position  itself,  and accompanying  shifts  in the sentiments  of the
public  and  political  leaders  concerning  trade  and  FDI  policies. Such  changes  are
hardly  systemic  revolutions,  but they  do create  uncertainties  in the  business
environment and  complicate business planning and  operations.  Political
instability,  in short,  is  not unique  to developing  countries.
Some empirically  based comparisons  between developing countries and
industrial  countries  challenge  conventional  perceptions  of relative  degrees  of
instability. In  particular,  fiscal  policy  was  actually  found  to  be less  stable
in nineteen  industrial  countries  as a group  than in nineteen  large  developing
countries  (Yu  1987). The relationship  between  the  instability  of a government
and  instability  of  fiscal  policy,  furthermore,  has  been  found  to  be  greater  among
industrial  countries  than  among  developing  countries  (Brewer  1985).  Although
these findings  are restricted  in their  policy  coverage  and in the forms of
instability  included,  the  broad  country  coverage  and  redundancy  in  the  findings
tend  to give them  credence.
These  findings suggest that  stereotypic thinking about  political
instability  in developing  countries  may be a  major impediment  to FDI.  If
potential  investors'  assessments  of  host-country  stability  were  more  speci£ic  and
factual,  they might find that  a given  prospective  investment  climate  is more
hospitable  than first imagined.  In sum, investors  should  be careful  to be
discrimirnating  and  not  unduly skittish in  their  reactions to perceived
instability  in  developing  countries.  They  should  not  allow  dramatic  episodes  --
such  as those  in  Cuba  in the  late  1950s,  Iran  in  the  late  1970s,  or in  China  in
the late  1980s--to  distort  their  perceptions  of the  investment  climate  for  FDI
projects in individual  countries.  Another area of potential distortion  in
investors'  perceptions  is that of more specific  "political"  or noncommercial
risks,  including  expropriation,  which  is  discussed  in the  next  chapter.29
Chapter  5
Host-Country  FDI  Restrictions  and  Incentives
As developing  countries  have  passed  through  periods  of changing  attitudes
toward  FDI  there  has  always  been a  widespread  ambivalence--a  positive  interest
in  its  potential  role  in  development  and  a  negative  view  of foreign  control  over
the  local  economy.  During  the  1980s,  however,  there  was  a  widespread  shift  in  the
balance  toward  a generally  more  positive  attitude,  particularly  in  reaction  to
the  external  debt  payment  problems  caused  by increased  borrowing  from  commercial
banks  in the  1970s.  The debt crisis led many countries to ease their
restrictions  on  FDI  and  put  increased  emphasis  on  export-oriented  FDI  projects.
These  shifting  sentiments  and  policies  concerning  FDI have varied  among
host countries.  Brazil, for instance,  adopted  a  generally  positive  policy
throughout  the 1970s,  when many other  developing  countries  were still  hostile
toward  FDI,  but  in  the  1980s  Brazil  increased  its  sectoral  FDI  restrictions  just
as other  countries  were liberalizing  theirs. A few countries--such  as India
(with  a  negative  attitude)  and  Kenya  (with  a  positive  view)--have  been  relatively
constant  in their  attitudes  toward  FDI for  many years,  with only  marginal  and
occasional  shifts.
One  particular  overall  trend  that  has been  clear  over the  past decade  is
the decline in instances  of expropriation. For some countries  the fear of
foreign  control  during  the period  of early independence  resulted  in numerous
expropriations.  The  incidence  of  expropriations,  however,  peaked  in  1975  and  has
declined dramatically  since then, as documented  in table 5-1.  Although
expropriation  has thus  waned as a problem  for investors,  host countries  have
adopted  diverse  restrictions  and  incentives  in  an  effort  to  influence  the  inflow
of  FDI. These  FDI  policy  components  are  described  below  in  summary  form  for  host
countries  in  general,  the  policy  tendencies  of  the  eleven  selected  host  countries
are then examined  and three recent  examples  of major FDI policy  cha ae are
considered.30
Table  5-1.  Trds  in  the  Incideae  of  Kxpeliatlm.  1960-1985
Year  Number  of  Acta  Number  of  Expropriating
of  expropriation  countries
1960  6  5
1961  a  5
1962  8  5
1963  11  7
1964  22  10
1965  14  11
1966  5  3
1967  25  8
1968  13  a
1969  24  16
1970  48  18
1971  51  20
1972  56  30
1973  30  20
1974  68  29
1975  83  28
1976  40  14
1977  15  13
1978  15  8
1979  17  13
1980  5  5
1981  4  2
1982  1  1
1983  3  3
1984  1  1
1985  1  1
Dgts:  An act  of  expropriation  is  defined  in  the  sources  as  the  expropriation  by one  country  in  one year  of
firms  in  one  industry.
Sorce:  Kobrin  (1984),  table  1;  and Minor  (1988),  table  1.
Summary  of  Policile
Host-country  policies  toward  FDI  can include  a broad  range  of incentives
and disincentives,  which  can  be classified  according  to  whether  they  affect  a
firm's  revenues,  input  costs,  or components  of the  value  added. Within  each  of
these  categories,  the  effect  of each  policy  instrument  on the  investor's  return
on equity  can  be identified  as either  positive  or negative--possibilities  that
are summarized  in table 5-2.  The list in the table is so exhaustive  and
detailed, that it is unnecessary  to comment on it at length.  It can be
mentioned, however, that a  host government can  easily create a  complex
combination  of these  elements  that  is  at once  both  enticing  and  restrictive  for
investors  and offers  many opportunities  for  obfuscation  and  change  on the  part
of government  officials. As we shall  note  below,  it is  not only  the  degree  of
hospitality  toward  FDI  embodied  in  such  policies,  but  also  their  transparency  and
stability  that  are important  to investors.31
Table  5-2.  Types  of  FDI  Policy  Incentives  and  Disincentives
Effect  on after-tax
Incentives/disincentives  return  on owner's  equity
Affe-cting  Revenues
Tariffs  +
Differential  sales/excise  tax  +  or -
Export  taxes/subsidies
(including  income  tax  credits)  +  or -
Quotas  +
Export  minimums
Price  controls  (or  relief  from)  +  or -
Multiple  exchange  rates  +  or -
General  overvaluation  of currency
Government  procurement  preference  +
Production/capacity  controls  +
Guarantees  against  government
competition  +
Prior  import  deposits  +
Transfer  price  administration
ffectinInuts
Tariffs
Differential  sales  taxes
(and  exemptions  therefrom)  +  or -
Export  taxes/subsidies
(including  utilities)  +  or -
Quotas
Price  controls  +
Multiple  exchange  rates  +  or -
Subsidy  or tax  for  public-
sector  suppliers  +  or -
Domestic-content  requirements
Prior  import  deposits
Transfer  price  administration
Limits  on royalties,  fees
Multiple  deductions  for  tax  purposes  +
Cash  or in-kind  grants  for  R&D  +32
Affecting  Comnonents  o-f.Value-Added
Capital
Direct  subsidy  +
Cost  of capital  goods
Tariff/sales  tax  exemption  on imported/
domestic  equipment  +
Prior  import  deposits
Local-content  requirement  for  capital
equipment
Limits  on use  of used equipment
Subsidized  buildings  +
Subsidized  cost  of transportation  +
Cost  of Debt
Subsidized  loafs  +
Loan  guarantees  +
Covering  of foreign  exchange  risks  on
foreign  loans  +
Priority  access  (including  limitations  on
foreign  firms)  +  or
Cost  of Equity
Subsidized  equity  through  public  invest-
ment  agencies  +
Exemption  from  capital  gains  tcexes/
registration  taxes  +
Dividend  tax/waiver  + or -
Guarantee  against  expropriation  or
differential  treatment  +
Limitations  on debt-equity  ratio
Controls/taxes  on remitted  dividends
Minimum  financial-in-kind  ratio
CorRorate  tax
Tax  holiday/reductions  +
Accelerated  depreciation  +
Special  deductions  and  valuation  practices
(inflation  adjustment,  multiple  plant
consolidation)  +
Tax sparing  and  double-taxation
agreements  +
Loss-carry-forward  provision  +  or -
Contractual  stabilization  of rates  +33
LAkQ
Wage subsidies  (includiiig  indirect,  that  is,
multiple  deductions  of wages  for  tax
computations/reduction  of taxes  on labor)  +
Training  grants  +
Minimum  wage
Relaxation  of  industrial  relations  laws  +
Local  labor  requirements
Cash subsidy  for  purchase/rental  +
Exemption/rebate  of taxes  on land  +
Not Classified
Limitations  on foreign  ownership
Free-trade  zones
General  preinvestment  assistance
Counrtrtrade  requirements
Po  .,  ,  exchange  balancing  requirements
Source:  Guisinger  and  Associates (1985).
These  FDI  policy  instruments  are  evident  in  a  variety  of  combinations  among
the eleven selected  host countries.  Brazil, for instance,  continues  to be
essentially  hospitable  toward  foreign  investors  but  retains  restrictions  in  some
industries  (petrochemicals,  telecommunications,  and informatics). Moreover,
there are joint venture requirements  in some sectors, and there have been
restrictions  on borrowing  and international  remittances.
Argentina's  policies  continue  to exhibit  the instability  that  has been
their hallmark since the late 1960s.  Yet, except for the 1973-76  period,
Argentina  has  generally  welcomed  FDI  and  adopted  a  moderately  liberal  FDI  policy
framework.  In 1989 it took ma'or steps to attract more foreign capital,
especially  by liberalizing  its  petroleum  sector. During  the  1980s,  as  a result
of the debt crisis,  there  were periodic  restrictions  on profit  and capital
transfers.
Colombia  has adopted  an  unusually  strong  sectoral  orientation  in its  FDI
policies.  As a member  of the Andean  Group since  1970,  Colombia  adopted  FDI
policies  with  a tilt  toward  control  rather  than  openness. Although  its  policies
gradually  were liberalized  in the  1980s,  they  still  favor  extractive  projects,
particularly  oil.34
Mexico  announced  a major liberalization  of its  FDI policy in May 1989.
Prior  to  that policy change, Mexico exhibited a  strong tendency toward
restricting  foreign  ownership,  especially  in the  natural  resources  industries.
The  Mexicanization  program  nevertheless  allowed  and--even  encouraged--
substantial  FDI  in  Mexico,  particularly  in  manufacturing. Although  Mexico  has
generally  adopted liberal  capital  and foreign  exchange  controls,  there  were
instances  in  the  1980s  when  restrictions  were  imposed  on  FDI-related  remittances.
Mexican  FDI  regulations  also  tend  to be complex.
Kenya's  FDI  policy  has included  relatively  liberal  elements  and  generous
incentives  that  have  been  available  in  selected  cases. It  has  also implemented
a  comprehensive  screening  system,  applied  an extensive  Africanization  program,
excluded  FDI from several  sectors,  and imposed  foreign  exchange  controls  and
borrowing  limits  on investors.  Kenya's  policy  is  presently  marked  by ambivalence
in its  basic  direction  and  administrative  details.
Nigeria  has recently  instituted  a  wide-ranging  liberalization  of its  FDI
regulations.  The main outlines include a streamlining  of  the regulatory
environment, a one-stop agency concept, simplification  and enlargement  of
incentives,  and  privatization  of  parastatals,  reversing  pr'or  foreign  ownership
restrictions.  In the past, however,  Nigerian  pe'icy  onsistently  involved
considerable complexity, uncertainty, and  delays  in  the  administrative
process--and  only  marginal  incentives.  (See  the  section  below  on  policy  change
for  further  details  on Nigeria's  policy.)
India  maintains  a  restrictive  FDI  policy  that  discourages  majority  foreign
ownership. Its  approach  to the  regulation  of FDI  depends  to an unusual  degree
on exchange  controls,  and there  is a strong  emphasis  on technology  transfer.
Regulations  are  flexible  depending  on  the  degree  of foreign  and  local  ownership,
with foreign  ownership  generally  limited  to 40 percent.  There  has been some
liberalizatien  of India's  restrictions  in recent  years,  but the overall  FDI
approach  remains  restrictive.
Indonesia's  FDI policy regime  has been marked by a mixture of both
moderately  liberal  and  restrictive  elements,  although  on  balance  it  has  offered
an increasingly  hospitable  climate  and  substaniial  relaxation  of  restrictions  on
FDI in recent  years.  Its restrictions  on capital repatriation  and profit
transfers  have been  minimal,  and fiscal  incentives  are supportive,  but not as
abundant  as they  used to  be.  At the  same  time  there  have  been  some  limitations
on  foreign  owned  projects  in  agriculture,  manufacturing,  and  services  (these  were
significantly  relaxed in 1989).  In the energy sector, no foreign equity
ownership  is  allowed,  although  other  forms  of foreign  investment  are  permitted.
Malays.a's  FDI policy  is conspicuous  among  the eleven  countries  i. its
mixture  of a  liberal  policy  that  reflects  a  positive  attitude  toward  FDI  and  a
restrictive  policy  that  reveals  a desire  to control  the  ownership  of  business
along domestic ethnic lines.  The result is an FDI policy combining two
alayers." 17 The  first  layer,  which  was put  in  place  during  the  1957-71  period,
included  few  limits  or  other  regulations;  instead,  the  emphasis  was  on  incentives
for  export-oriented  projects  that  used local  raw  materials  and  ethnic  Malay35
labor. A  major  shift  occurred  in  1971  with  the  establishment  of  the  New  Economic
Policy  (NEP),  which  was  designed  to foster  ethnic  Malay  ownership  of  businesses
within Malaysia--a measure that had  important consequences for FDI.  A
distinction  was made in the  amount  of foreign  ownership  allowed,  depending  on
whether  a  project  was  import-substituting  or  export  oriented. Thus,  new import-
substituting  FDI projects  were required  to have majority  ownership  by ethnic
Malays  at the  outset,  and  any forei&u  ownership was required  to  be phased  out
by 1990.  Majority  foreign  ownership  was still permitted  in export-orienLed
projects, but foreign  ownership  overall  had  to  be  reduced  to  30  percent  of  total
FDI stock  by 1990.  In 1986 these  NEP  ownership  restrictions  were relaxed,  at
least  temporarily.
The  regulatory  framework  for  FDI  in  Thailand  is  relatively  liberal,  except
that there are significant  sectoral  restrictions  on FDI.  Majority  foreign
ownership is not  allowed in some manufacturing  sectors and most service
businesses.  in  sectors  that  are  freely  open  to  foreign  investors,  however,  there
is freedom of profit remittance and capital repatriation.  In addition,
Thailand's  industrial  policy  includes  a generous  package  of incentives  that  are
equally  available  to foreign  investors  (in  permitted  industries)  and domestic
investors.
In  Korea  a liberal  FDI  policy  regime  has  prevailed  since  1984. Under  the
system  in  effect  since  then,  foreign  investment  is  allowed  in  most  sectors,  the
percentage  of  foreign  ownership  is  generally  not  limited,  and  capital  and  profits
can  be freely  transferred. Prior  to the  liberalization  measures  in the  early
1980s,  however,  there  were extensive  restrictions  on FDI.
To assess  the  effects  of these  policies  on FDI it is  helpful  to isolate
several  major  dimensions  of the  policies. 18 One  obvious  dimension  is  the  degree
to which  the host country is hospitable to FDI--a dimension  that  varies
considerably  both across countries  and over time for any one country.  In
table  5-3  the  eleven  countries  are  listed  with  the  degree  of  hospitality  of  their
FDI  polices  during  the  two-and-a-half  decades  covered  by  the  country  studies,  and
then separately  for the  period  since  the  early  1980s.
As examples  of extreme  opposites,  Brazil,  which has generally  adopted
hospitable  FDI  policies,  has  experienced  disproportionately  large  amounts  of  FDI
flows,  while  India  nas  been  the  recipient  of  disproportionately  low  levels  of  FDI
as a result  of its  relat:vely  inhospitable  policies. The  relationship  between
a hospitable  policy  and FDI flows,  however,  is only  approximate; the  overall
attractiveness  of a  host country's  FDI  policies  depends  on other  dimensions  as
well,  particularly  their  transparency  and  their  steadiness  (see  Becsky,  Lee,  and
Ordu 1990  and  Frank  1980).36
Both transparency  and steadiness  are important  because they affect  the
degree  of uncertainty  that investors  face as they contemplate  FDI projects.
Because  investors  are  sensitive  to the  estimated  risks  as  well as the  projected
returns  associated  with  investments  and  because  they  always  face  commercial  risks
associated  with  doing  business  in  a  country,  any  additional  uncertainty  about  the
prospects  for  a  given  investment  created  by a lack  of transparency  or stability
in a  host country's  FDI policies  can be a serious  deterrent to investors'
investment  plans. A  lack  of  transparency  in  FDI  regulations  and  incentives  makes
investors'  estimates  of the costs associated  with host FDI regulations  more
problematic;  it also  makes  their  estimates  of the  benefits  associated  with the
host FDI incentives  more difficult  to calculate.  Furthermore,  it is often
difficult  to determine  the extent  to which formal  versus informal  rules  are
actually  operative  in  a  given  country  at a  given  time. Some  countries,  however,
tend to be rather formal  in their  approach,  while others  rely much more on
informal  interpretations  of the  rules  in  their  application  to individual  cases.
A frequent  result  of the  informal  approach,  however,  is that  there  are  so many
exceptions  to  the  rules  that  the  rules  become  practically  meaningless  and  there
is ircreased  uncertainty  for investors. Nevertheless,  if the  exceptions  are
codified,  the  formal  rules  become  overly  complex  and  confusing  to investors.37
Table  5.3  Major  Dimensions  of Host Country  FDI  Policies
Country  Steadiness  Transparency  Hospitality
Argentina  -/-  +/+  -/+
Brazil  +/+  +/+  +/+
Colombia  -/-  --  -/+
Mexico  -/-  +/+
India  +/+  +/+  -/-
Indonesia  +/+  +/+  +/+
Korea,  Rep. of  -/-  +/+  -/+
Malaysia  -/-  -/-  +/+
Thailand  -+  -- +/+
Kenya  -/-  +/+
Nigeria  -/-  -/+  -/-
wy.3te  Sign  before  the  slash  refers  to  overall  record  of the  past two-and-a-half
decades. Sign  after  the  slash  refers  to the  period  since  the  early  1980s.
Source: These  are summary  judgments  based on the evidence  in Becsky,  Lee  and
Ordu (1990),  as supplemented  by codings  by Thomas  L. Brewer  and  Alovsius  Ordu.
Illustrative  Recent  Policy  Changes
Investors, of  course, find  some policy  changes to  their  liking,
particularly  changes  that are  comprehensive  liberalizations  of policy  and are
likely  to remain  in  effect  for  an extended  period  of time;  sue..  policy  changes
can have  a  significant  effect on FDI  flows.  Comprehensive  packages of
liberalization  of  policy  are  often  followed  by  significant  increases  in  FDI,  and
comprehensive  packages  of  increased  restrictiveness  are  similarly  often  followed
by dramatic  declines  in FDI.  (Becsky,  Lee, and  Ordu 1990,  contains  detailed
analyses  of several  instances;  a  few  are  highlighted  here for  brief  illustrative
purposes.)
The  correspondence  between  comprehensive  FDI  policy  change  and  changes  in
FDI flows  has been obvious  in Korea.  A generally  liberal  policy, including
incentives  for  FDI,  was in  place  from  1960  to  1973. After  an initial  period  when
FDI remained  at modest  levels,  it increased  substantially  by the early  1970s.
(An increase in restrictiveness  in 1965 was  largely directed at Japanese
investors  and  not  effectively  implemented  in  any  case.) In 1°73  more  extensive
regulations  were imposed,  including  major restrictions  on ownership;  foreign
ownership  was generally  limited  to 50 percent,  minimum  investment  levels  were
established,  and  investments  that  competed  with  domestic  Korean  firms  were  rarely
approved. As a result  annual  FDI  flows  declined  during  the  mid and  late  1970s.38
FDI policy  reversal  embodied  in a series  of measures  taken in 1980-84
subsequently  reversed  the  trend  in  FDI  flows. These  measures  greatly  simplified
and liberalized  FDI  policies.  This reversal  in policy  was a response  to the
cumulative  effects  of  the  oil  price  increases  of  the  middle  and
late  1970s--including  negative  growth  in  GDP  isi  1980,  the  first  such  decline  in
more than  twenty  years. The  change  in  FDI  policy  was  undertaken  not  merely  for
short-term  balance  of  payments  reasons,  but  also  as  part  of  a  more  comprehensive
shift in policy that was designed  to increase  the competitiveness  of Korean
industry  over the  long  term. 19
In September 1t980  an initial list of measures to encourage FDI was
introduced.  They  increased  the  percentage  of foreign  ownership  allowed  in some
projects,  lowered  the  minimum  size  of investment,  and  allowed  foreign  partici-
pation in a broader range  of projects.  In July 1981 additional  guidelines
further  reduced  the  restrictions. In September  1983  the  government  announced
major  simplifications  in the  FDI  regulations,  as  well as the  introduction  of a
"negative  list"  which  allowed  investments  unless  they  were  on  the  prohibited  list
(rather  than  the  previous  reverse  practice  of  allowing  only  investments  that  were
on  the  approved  list),  a  change  that  was  a  significant  liberalization,  not  merely
a semantic  or administrative  gimmick. The  new regulations  became  effective  on
July 1, 1984.
Pecent  FDI  policy  changes  in Nigeria  are also  an example  of the  kind  of
comprehensive  policy  change  that investors  prefer. The  effect  on FDI flows  is
not  yet  apparent,  however,  because  the  major  changes  embodied  in its  industrial
policy were only published in 1988.20  Adopted as a  consequence  of the
Structural  Adjustment  Program of 1986, the new Nigerian industrial  policy
represents  a significant  departure  from  previous  FDI  policy. The  new approach
attempts  to  create  an  FDI  policy  framework  that  is  much  simpler  and  clearer  than
ir.  the  past.  In  institutional  terms,  Decree  Number  36  establishes  an  Industrial
Development  Coordination  Committee  (IDCC),  which  has the  authority  to approve
preinvestment  agreements,  fiscal  incentives,  employment  permits  for  foreigners,
and  foreign  capital  imports,  as  we'll  as to  provide  policy  advice  to  the  federal
government.  The IDCC is a "one-stop"  agency  for FDI; unless  an investor  is
informed  otherwise,  it  can  assume  its  application  has  been approved  sixty  days
after  submission.
The shift in Nigeria's  approach  to FDI policy  includes  changes in the
substance  of policy in addition  to streamlining  the FDI approval  process.
Although there are still significant  restrictions  on foreign  ownership,  the
revisions  of the  Nigerian  Enterprises  Promotion  Decree  create  a simpler  policy
and  allow  a  much  wider  scope  for  new  foreign  investments.  There  is  now  a  single
schedule  of restricted  industries  to  replace  the  previous  three  schedules. The
Privatization  and  Commercialization  Decree  of 1988  does not set  any limits  on
foreign  ownership  of the  state  economic  enterprises  earmarked  for  complete  or
partial  privatization. This privatization  program is complemented  by a new
debt-equity  conversion  program  potentially  totalling  $8 billion  (28  percent  of
the  external  debt).39
The  new FDI policy also includes  an extensive array of new  fiscal
incentives,  including  a  100 percent tax holiday for seven years, plus an
additional 5 percent depreciation  beyond the initial capital depreciation
allowance  for  investments  in  disadvantaged  areas. There  are  also  tax  reductions
for the  construction  of infrastructure,  research  and  development  activities  in
Nigeria,  and  in-plant  training  programs.
FDI policy  changes announced  by Mexico in May 1989 also appear to be
relatively comprehensive  and  should alter  investors' perceptions of  the
investment  climate. The intention  of the  new  policy  is to facilitate  foreign
investment  in most sectors  by making the FDI regulations  simpler and more
transparent and  by  allowing majority foreign ownership. Under  the  new
regulations,  foreign  investment  up to  $100  million  and  majority  ownership  up to
100  percent  will  be allowed  if  seven  explicit  tests  are  met.  In  addition  to the
$100  million  limit,  the  criteria  are that  financing  of the  project  be entirely
external;  that the initial  outlay  be at least  20 percent  of the total  project
cost; that the  project  achieve  foreign  exchange  self-sufficiency  within  three
years;  that technology  in  keeping  with environmental  regulations  be used;  that
the  project  be located  outside  the  Valley  of  Mexico,  Monterrey,  and  Guadalajara;
and that the project create permanent employment  and provide training for
Mexicans. Any project  meeting  these  tests  will  be approved.
Most  sectors  of  the  economy  will  come  under  these  new  regulations  and  thus
will be more open to foreign  investment. Some industries,  however,  such as
petrochemicals  and automotive  parts,  will  be subject  to  different  regulations.
Special  trust  funds  providing  for  majority  foreign  ownership  for  twenty  years  can
be established  in those  industries. This  plan is  an application  to industrial
FDI  projects  of  a  program  that  has  been  used  previously  by the  Mexican  government
for FDI projects in tourism--a  plan that aliows an additional  thirty-year
extension  before  expiration.  After  the  expiration  of the  trust  fund  period  the
foreign  investor  must become  a minority  shareholder,  so the scheme  for these
selected  industries  is  in  essence  a  program  of  deferred  Mexicanization  (Financial
Times,  May 25,  1989,p.8).
In  sum,  the  degree  of  hospitality  extended  to  foreign  direct  investors  is
only one of many important  features  affecting  the attractiveness  of host FDI
policies.  The transparency  of FDI regulations  is also important,  because
investors  need to know in advance  how the host-country  regulations  will be
applied  to their  projects.  If there is a high degree  of variability  in the
interpretation  of the  r  g,ulations,  or if  it is  necessary  to  obtain  the  approval
of multiple  host-goveriment  agencies  (which  may  disagree  among  themselves),  an
otherwise hospitable host-country environment will  become  unattractive.
Furthermore,  steadiness  in the FDI regulations  is important to investors.
Because  foreign  direct  investors  already face  the normal  commercial  risks  of
doing  business,  plus  the additional  uncertainties  of  being foreign  to the  host
country,  constantly  changing  FDI  regulations  can  be a significant  deterrent  to
FDI flows.  Consequently,  host countries  that  exhibit  not only  hospitable  but
also  transparent  and  stable  policies  provide  investors  with  unusually  attractive
conditions  for  FDI.40
Debt-EquitX  SwaDs
In recent  years debt-equity  swap programs  have been widely used as an
additional  incentive  in  FDI  policies. Because  the  host  government  buys the  debt
instruments  from  the  investor  at a smaller  discount  than  the investor  receives
from the commercial  bank, the host government  is subsidizing  the investor's
equity  investment.  Host  governments commonly restrict  the  investment
opportunities  to  selected  sectors,  and  they  also  often  restrict  investors'  profit
remittances. After  a slow  start  in the  mid-1980s,  debt-equity  swaps  initiated
by developing  countries  had  reached  $8.9  billion  by 1988 (World  Bank,  Quarterly
Review  of Financial  Flows  to Developing  Countries,  March  1989).  In addition,
there  were informal  conversions  directly  between  creditors  and  debtors  without
formal  government  involvement,  as well as exit bonds  and other types  of debt
reduction  programs,  so the total  magnitude  of debt conversion  transactions  in
that  year amounted  to $21.1  billion.
These  transactions  have  been  highly  concentrated,  with  more  than  90  percent
in four  Latin  American  countries:  Brazil,  Mexico,  Chile,  and  Argentina. Among
the  other  eleven  selected  countries,  however,  the  recently  developed  program  of
Nigeria  has  attracted  much  interest.  Asian  trading  firms  already  in  Nigeria  have
been particularly  active in using debt-equity  conversions  as a  means of
diversifying  their portfolios into additional  sectors.  At the first three
auctions between November 1988 and February 1989, limits of $40 million,
$30  million, and  $25  million were  established  to  constrain the  domestic
inflationary  impact  of the  conversions.  Over  the  three  auctions  bids totalling
$334.4  million  were received,  at discounts  ranging  from  36 to 58 percent.
Although  these  and other  debt-equity  swap  programs  may offer individual
investors  highly  attractive  opportunities  for FDI projects,  their  ability  to
stimulate  additional  new  investment  that  wou'd  not  otherwise  have  taken  place  and
their  monetary  and balance  of payments  consequxences  pose a variety  of issues.
In any case, such programs  are likely to remain important,  if specialized,
features  of the FDI policy framework  of many countries  for the foreseeable
future.41
Chapter  6
Policies  of Home Governments  and  International  In3titutions
Home  governments  and  international  institutions  have  adopted  a  variety  of
policies  designed  to facilitate  the  flow  of FDI to  developing  countries. They
include guarantees  for investors  against noncommercial  ("political")  risks,
project opportunity  information  services,  and project finance  assistance  for
investors,  policy  advice  for  host  governments,  dispute  settlement  services,  and
equity  participation  in  projects. In  addition,  there  are  numerous  data  banks  and
other information  services  that  are available  for  private  sector  investors  as
well as public  sector  organizations.
Although not directly focused  on FDI, grant and lending programs  of
international  institutions  and developed  countries  that provide support for
stabilization, structural adjustment, and  privatization  policies in host
developing  countries  have important  consequences  for the macroeconomic  and
sectoral  environment  of  FDI  projects.  Given  the  importance  of  these  host-country
conditions,  as  emphasized  in  chapter  4,  such  policies  should  not  be neglected  in
any comprehensive  analysis  of the role of home governments  and international
institutions  in facilitating  FDI  flows  to developing  countries. It is such  a
broad  and complex  topic  in itself,  however,  that it  cannot  be discussed  in  any
detail  here. Rather,  this  chapter  will  focus  on  policies  that  are  more  directly
concerned  with FDI.
Guarantees
Numerous  multilateral  and  bilateral  treaties  and  other  agreements  have  been
developed  to establish  a legal  framework  for FDI  guarantee  programs  and other
policies. The latest  and  perhaps  most significant  is the  establishment  of tbe
Multilateral  Investment  Guarantee  Agency (MIGA)  within the  World Bank group.
MIGA's  programs  of investment  guarantees  and other services  are intended  to
supplement  the activities  of other international  institutions  and national
governments.  The creation of MIGA within the World Bank group marks the
beginning  of  a  new  era  in  the  public  policy  framework  affecting  FDI  in  developing
countries. Despite  the  long  negotiations  required  to draft  its  convention  and
obtain  sufficient  signatories  to  bring  it into  force,  that  a new international
agency, created with the cooperation  of both the developing  and developed
countries,  is in itself  an indication  of a change  in the  climate  of official
opinion  concerning  FDI.
Since  it  has only  recently  become  operational,  MIGA's  programs  are still
in  the  formative  stage. It is  likely  to  evolve  into  a  participant  in  three  broad
areas of policy concerning  FDI.  The first and most obvious is to provide
guarantees  against  noncommercial  risks.  Its  role in this  activity  is  designed
to  supplement  the  existing  national  home  government  programs  and  the  programs  of
private "political  risk"  insurers--a  role that  has two  components. The first
component  is  based  on  MIGA's  authority  to  issue  guarantees  on its  own  behalf  for
individual  projects,  which  will tend  to  be projects  in  host-countries  that  are42
not covered  by the investors'  home-country  guarantee  programs  or  projects  that
are otherwise  not eligible  for  home-country  coverage. The second  component  is
based  on  MIGA's  authority  to  issue  guarantees  for  projects  that  are  sponsored  by
home-government  agencies,  which will enable the home-government  agencies to
diversify  their  portfolios  of guarantees.
Most developed  countries  have long had government  agencies  that issue
guarantees  agains:..  noncommercial  risks.  Like MIGA, many of these national
programs  can protect  investors  against  losses  from  expropriation,  restrictions
on  profit  remittances  and  other  funds  transfers,  war  and  other  forms  of  violence,
and  in  some  instances, contract repudiation as  well.  Although these
home-government  investment  guarantee  schemes  are  well  known,  they  are  not  widely
used.  In the early  1980s only about 9 percent of the total FDI stock in
developing  countries from OECD countries  was covered  by their home country
investment  guarantee  programs,  and only  about  20 percent  of the flows  at that
time  were being  covered  (Shihata  1982,  p.12). There  have been,  however,  large
variations  in the  extent  of coverage  among  countries--with  Japan  at  one  extreme
(over  50  percent  coverage)  and  several  West  European  countries  at  the  other  (less
than 5 percent coverage).  The generally  low levels  can be attributed  to a
variety of factors,  including  restrictions  on eligibility  based on national
interest  considerations,  limited  financial  resources  of  guarantee  agencies,  and
concerns  about  portfolio  diversification.
For  companies  from  the  U.S. this issue  is investigated  in  more detail  in
a recent study that surveyed  multinational  corporations  concerning  their
investment  decisions  in  developing  countries  (Wallace,  forthcoming).  Among  the
cooperations  covered,  roughly  one-quarter  were insured  one  way or the other.
Most of the  companies  were  at least  partially  protected  under  the  scheme  of the
U.S. government's  Overseas  Private  Investment  Corporation  (OPIC),  and  another  8
percent were thinking  about becoming  insured  by OPIC.  MIGA, although  just
established,  received  much attention,  with 13 percent  of the  companies  either
considering  or  already  committed  to  MICA. Some  companies  had  participated  in  an
insurance  scheme  in  the  past  and  later  withdrew;  they  had  decided  to  reduce  their
foreign  investment  to  a level  low  enough  to  make risk  insurance  obsolete. Most
companies  that are not insured  against  political  risk considered  this issue
critical  to  their  investment  decision,  while  only  about  60  percent  of  the  insured
companies  consider  this issue  to be critical.  Thus, there  are two kinds of
companies  when risk  behavior  is considered:  those  which  perceive  the reduced
political  risk (for  example,  the  declining  number  of expropriations)  .. orrectly,
and therefore  feel less of a need for insurance,  and those  which do not get
involved in more detailed risk considerations  at all and avoid high risk
regions.  21
There  are  also  a  small  number  of  private  political  risk  insurers.  Because
these  are private  organizations,  they  have great flexibility  in the kinds  of
coverage and projects and the host-country  locations  they chocse to cover
compared  with home government  agencies.  Their fees are also higher  and the
duration  of their  coverage  shorter  than those  of the  government  programs.43
Other  ISSues
Although  HIGA's  guarantee  program  received  the  most  attention  during  its
formation,  its  informational  and  advisory  services  for  governments  and  investors,
as well as its  potential  to  become  a key international  institutional  forum  for
FDI  policymaking  are  also  central  to its  mission.
MIGA's  informational  and  advisory  services  for  investors  will supplement
an array of programs already in existence  under the auspices  of national
governments  and international  organizations. For  instance,  the  United  Nations
Industrial  Development  Organization  has an investment  promotion  office  in New
York.  As an example  of a  home government  investor  information  service,  OPIC
maintains  an  Opportunity  Bank  listing  information  about  projects  for  which  host
governments  seek investors.
In  addition  to  the  information  activities  of  such  FDI  investment  guarantee
agencies,  there  are  also  other  agencies  that  can  provide  prospective  investors
with  information  about projects and the investment  climate in developing
countries. In the  U.S. these  include  the  Commerce  Department,  the  Agriculture
Department, the  Trade and  Development  Program of  the U.S.  International
Development  Cooperation  Agency,  and  other  agencies  as  well.  Furthermore,  many
host  governments  have investment  promotion  offices  in  New  York  and  other  cities
to  supplement  the  promotional  activities  of  their  own  embassies  and  ministries.
These diverse governmental  sources and  the numerous commercial  and other
nongovernmental  sources provide investors  with ample and readily available
sources  of  information  that  they  might  seek  for  planning  and  operating  particular
proj  ects.  22
In addition,  many home governments  provide  project finance  assistance
through  programs  of  loans  to  investors, loan  guarantees, and  equity
participation.  The funding for these programs is often modest,  but their
marginal  contribution  to  individual  projects  can  nevertheless  be significant.  A
study  of six such programs  found  that  most of them  made annual  commitments  to
corporations  totaling  approximately  $100-$800  million  each  during  FY1983  (Ghadar
Associates  1985). The  study  included  agencies  of  France,  the  United  Kingdom,  the
Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  the  Netherlands,  and  the  European  Community.  Among
international  agencies, the project finance  activities  of the International
Finance  Corporation  (IFC)  are  also  well  known.
The existing array of home government  and international  institutions
designed  to  facilitate FDI  in  developing countries  is  comprehensive.
Nevertheless,  there  will  always  be questions  about  the  "additionality"  of  these
programs,  that is,  the additional  amount  of FDI  that is made  because  of these
programs  that  would  not  otherwise  be undertaken.  The  evidence  indicates  that
these  programs  do have an effect  on  particular  projects  in rather  direct  ways.
For  instance,  a  study  of  the  additionality  of  the  programs  of  OPIC  concluded  that
25  percent  to 82  percent  of the  investments  covered  by OPIC  would  not  have  been
undertaken  without  that  coverage  (Arthur  Young  and  Company  1982). On the  basis
of an extrapolation  of those  findings  for  OPIC and  depending  on the  assumptions
about the capitalization  levels  and substitution  levels  for MIGA's program,
MIGA's  guarantee  program  could  stimulate  annual  additional  FDI  of  several  hundred
million  dollars  a year (see  Moran  1986).44
The  most  important  element  of  these  programs,  however,  may  be their  effects
on the  general  perspectives  and  policies  of investors  and  host  countries.  As far
as  host  governments  are  concerned,  the  effect  of the  international  institutions,
in  particular,  includes  pointing  the  direction  toward  new  policies  and  providing
policy  reform  assistance.  In  this  way  programs  can  contribute  to  the  development
of a  more favorable  host-country  investment  climate. For  investors,  the  active
interest  of international  institutions  in projects ard their more general
educational  and informational  function  can  alter  investors'  .erceptions  of the
host-country  investment  climate,  and  thus facilitate  FDI.45
Chapter  7
Outlook  for the  Future
The  eleven  selected  host  countries  present  a  wide range  of prospects  for
FDI  and illustrate  the  diverse  array  of factors  that  influence  those  prospects.
Comprehensive  recent  changes  in  FDI  policy  and  macroeconomic  policy  in  Mexico  and
Nigeria  offer  investors  the  prospect  of  significantly  more  attractive  investment
climates, although concern about future economic stability in Mexico and
political  stability  in  Nigeria  could  still  hinder  investment.  The net  result,
however,  is that  average  annual  FDI  flows  are  likely  to increase  for  those  two
countries  over the  next  five  years.
In Brazil  significant  FDI  sectoral  restrictions  and  economic  instability
constrain  FDI,  but  a  generally  hospitable  climate  toward  FDI  prevails,  and  in  the
long  term  Brazil's  market  size  will continue  to  be an attraction  for FDI. The
net  effect  of  these  conflicting  forces  is  likely  to  be  modest  growth  in  FDI  flows
over  the  next  five  years. In  contrast,  the  recent  political  changes  in  Argentina
will  create  additional  uncertainties  for  prospective  foreign  investors,  who  will
likely adopt a wait-and-see  posture for a year or two as they assess the
investment  climate,  and thus  contribute  to declir.es  in FDI  flows.
The  liberalization  of FDI  policies  by  Korea,  in  combination  with  economic
stability,  is likely  to  encourage  continued  increases  in  annual  FDI  inflows. In
Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Thailand,  and  Kenya,  the  absence  of any  dramatic  change  in
the  mixture  of forces  affecting  FDI  flows  suggests  average  anrual  investment  over
the  next five  years  at similar  or slightly  higher  levels  than  during  the  past
five  years.
Among the  eleven  selected  countries  the  greatest  potential  for increased
FDI is in India.  Given  its  market  size and  relative  political  stability,  the
basic economic  and  political  conditions  offer  foreign  investors  an attractive
environment.  Yet,  compared  with  the  other  ten  countries,  the  ratio  of FDI  to  GDr
is by far the lowest  in India.  If the ratio of FDI flows to GDP for India
reached  the  mean levels  of the  other  ten  countries  for  the  1983-87  period,  there
would  be more than  a twentyfold  increase  over the  levels  during  the  comparable
period  for India.  There is already  a stock  of FDI in place in India,  and it
could  serve  as  a  basis  for  additional  FDI. There  is,  furthermore,  a  considerable
degree  of diversity  in  both the  number  of source  countries  represented  and the
sectoral  distribution.  For  India  to  attract  FDI  flows,  liberalization  policies
would  have to  be adopted.
Global  Changes
Aggregate  FDI  flows  to  all  developing  countries  are  likely  to  average  about
SDR15  billion  a year in the  early  1990s.  They  are not likely  to exceed  SDR20
billion  per  year  before  1993. The  sectoral  prospects  for  FDI  vary  considerably
for  minerals, agriculture, manufacturing, and  services--both  because of
variations  in the  economic  forces  that  drive  FDI  and because  host-country  FDI
policy  profiles  are  likely  to  continue  to differ  acrosb  sectors. For  the46
services sector, for  instance, increasing real  incomes in  middle- and
upper-middle-income  developing  countries  will increase  market  size,  and thus
their attractiveness  as locations  for FDI in services.  At the same time,
however,  a strong  tradition  of restrictiveness  in  services  trade  and  investment
policies  is likely  to constrain  FDI.
The  policies  of  the  developed  countries  are  not  likely  to  yield  significant
increases  in  the  total  magnitudes  of  FDI  flows  to  developing  countries  within  the
next three  years  unless  economic  reforms  in  many developing  countries  improve
investment  climate  substantially.  The  developed  countries'  programs  to  promote
FDI  in developing  countries  through  guarantees  against  noncommercial  risks  and
other means have been in place for many years.  Even if there were major
increases in these promotional  efforts in the next year or two--which  is
unlikely--there  would  be a lag  of several  years  before  they  had much  effect  on
FD! flows.
The  implementation  of  the  European  Community's  (EC)  1992  program  of  further
reductions  in  barriers  to  intra-regional  trade  and  investment  is  already  having
an impact on FDI patterns.  Thus far, the most important  effect is that
corporations  based  in  the  United  States  and  Japan  have  been  expanding  inside  the
EC  to  serve  the  larger  European  market  and  to  protect  themselves  from  the  effects
of the more restrictive  external  trade  barriers.  To the extent that their
increased  FDI activities  in  Europe  use their  scarce  financial,  managerial,  and
other  resources,  these  corporations'  FDI  activities  in  developing  countries  will
be limited. This would  be particularly  the  case as long  as the  United  States
remains  the  preferred  destination  of Japanese  FDI.
Also,  European  firms  themselves  will  be  incteasing  their  investment  within
Europe  in  anticipation  of the  growth  of their  regional  markets,  which  will  also
reduce their interest  in FDI in developing  countries.  In addition,  as the
reduction  of  intra-regional  barriers  makes  imports  from  developing  countries  less
competitive  with goods  produced  in Europe,  there  will be less incentive  for
expert-oriented  FDI  projects  in  developing  countries  that  serve  European  markets.
Over the  longer term, however, the  income-increasing  effects of  further
integration  in Europe  will increase  the  demand  for imports,  including  imports
from  FDI  projects  in developing  countries.
Nevertheless,  the net effect  of all these  factors  on FDI in developing
countries  is  unlikely  to  be dramatic. FDI,  particularly  in the  primary  sector
is unlikely  to be affected  much at all, at least  in the short  term,  and will
probably  be positively  influenced  in the long  term.  In the  secondary  sector,
because  the  production  processes  in  many  manufacturing  industries,  such  as  motor
vehicles,  are  already  highly  integrated  internationally  and  include  component  and
assembly  operations  in developing  countries,  increased  manufacturing  FDI in
Europe  is  unlikely  to  replace  FDI  projects  in  developing  countries.  Finally,  FDI
in  services  in  developing  countries  is  more  affected  by local  host-country  market
conditions  and FDI policies  than  by conditions  in Europe.  In sum, then,  the
consequences  of the EC 1992 program  may reduce  FDI flows from developed  to
developing  countries  somewhat  below  what they would have been over the next
several  years,  but it is  unlikely  to  have  a significant  effect.47
The  United States will continue to attract large amounts of  FDI,
particularly  from  Japan,  as  the  U.S.  trade  deficit  persists. Thus,  macroeconomic
conditions  and  policies  in the.  developed  countries  will  continue  to  be major
influences  on FDI flows to developing  countries,  just as the macroeconomic
conditions  and  policies  of  the  developing  host  countries  themselves  will  continue
to  be important  influences.
onclusio
Any  consideration  of the  future  of FDI  in  developing  countries  should  not
be limited  to an analysis  of aggregate  quantities  of flows of resources  to
developing  countries  because  the  effects  of FDI  can  often  be  understood  best  at
the levjl  of individual  projects.  FDI is qualitatively  different  because it
consists  of a  bundle  of services  with diverse  effects  on the  local  economy  and
projects  are integrated  into  large,  often  global,  corporate  networks.
FDI projects thus make distinctive  contributions  to the development
process.  They bring in  new production  and  other  technologies,  new managerial
skills,  new  marketing  and  finance  opportunities,  new  approaches  to  a  variety  of
managerial  issues,  and  new relationships  with the  world  economy.  Even in  cases
where  the  FDI  project  is  in  the  form  of  an  acquisition  of  existing  companies,  the
new foreign  owner  often  makes  changes  in operations  and  strategic  orientation.
Such  changes  may  not  only  contribute  to the  economic  development  process,
but also have controversial  political  and cultural  consequences,  as well as
economic  costs.  For example,  highly  protective  incentives  to attract  FDI may
result in distorted  resource  allocation.  In any case, questions  about the
distribution  of the  costs  and  benefits  of  FDI,  and  its  noneconomic  effects,  will
always  be raised. Although  the  recent  changes  toward  more positive  attitudes
about FDI in many developing  countries  are surely  indicative  of a much more
receptive  climate  of  opinion,  some  degree  of  ambivalence  and  a  consequent  desire
to  control  foreign-owned  business  will  continue.  The  future  of  FDI  in  developing
countries  will therefore  be shaped  to  a  great  extent  by the  government-business
interactions  involved  in  the  entry  negotiations  and  the  operations  of individual
projects. There  will  consequently  continue  to  be significant  variations  across
industries  and host countries  in the  patterns  and trends  of FDI in developing
countries.
Such variations  do not alter the central  fact that a new FDI era has
emerged--an  era  marked  by a greater  recognition  of the  benefits  of FDI in the
development  process.  In this  era, the focus  of attention  has shifted  to the
specific,  tangible  ways that  host governments  (as  well  as home governments  and
international  institutions)  can  change  their  policies  and  devise  new  mechanisms
to  facilitate  the  flow  of FDI  to  developing  countries.  'It  is  an  era  of  pragmatic
cooperation  and  policy  innovation.
To this end, there is an important  scope for the World Bank group,
especially  with the  establishment  of MIGA,  to  assist  host governments  in their
efforts to translate  more positive  attitudes  about FDI into tangible  policy
reforms,  will  be increasingly  important.48
Appendix  1
Although  the OECD has contint'  J  to collect  and publish FDI data, this
information  is  generally  less  comprehensive  and  authoritative  than  IMF  data. The
OECD  data  are source-country  based  and  include  only  FDI  outflows  of OECD  member
countries;  the  geographic  scope  of  the  data  is  therefore  less  comprehensive  than
that  of the  IMF  figures. As FDI  outflows  from  non-OECD  countries  increase,  the
limited source-country  coverage  of the OECD data thus becomes increasingly
problematic,  especially  for some individual  recipient  countries  for example,
Malaysia. OECD  data  are  also  less  comprehensive  than  IMP  data  in  their  treatment
of FDI-related  borrowing.  For any given host country,  OECD figures  on FDI
consequently  tend  to  be somewhat  lower  thar  corresponding  IMF  figures,  although
they  are  not  uniformly  so.  Furthermore,  neither  OECD  data  nor IMF  data  are  very
helpful for sectoral  analyses;  instead  the UNCTC data are the best for this
purpose.5
For  some  countries  and  time  periods  the  FDI  data  are  marked  by  considerable
variability;  this  can  be true  for  time  trends  as  well  as absolute  magnitudes  in
any one year.  Nevertheless,  there are moderately  strong positive linear
relationships  among  the  data  series  for  most  countries  over the  1968-86  period
so that  the  basic long-term  patterns  and trends  are similar  across  data sets.
Table  7-1  contains  correlations  among  the  data  series  for  the  eleven  countries.
In addition to Nigeria, the most problematic  countries are Indonesia and
Malaysia. OECD data  are  especially  deficient  for  Malaysia  because  they  do not
include  the  large  amounts  of FDI  from  non-OECD  countries. Neither  the  OECD  nor
the  IMF  alone  is  entirely  satisfactory  for  Indonesia  because  of  gaps  in  sectoral
coverage  in the  IMF  data  and the  omission  of FDI  related  borrowing  in the  OECD
data.  (The  new data  base being  developed  at the  UNCTC  corresponds  most  nearly
to national  or Institute  for Research  and Information  on Multinationals  [IRMJ
data in  table  7-1).49
Table 7-1:  Correlations  among  Data  Series  for  FDI  Flows
IMF-national  OECD-national
Country  IMF-OECD  (or  IRM) 6 (or  IRM)a
data  data  data
Argentina  .63  .96  .78
Brazil  .66  .47  .57
Colombia  .84  .71  .59
Mexico  .50  .72  .55
Indiab  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Indonesia  .27  1.00  .24
Korea,  Rep. of  .57  .91  .60
Malaysia  -. 06  .97  -. 06
Thailand  .75  n.a.  n.a.
Kenya  .48  .89  .68
Nigeria  -. 02  -. 07  .61
n.a.  Not  available
NOTE:  Correlation  coefficients  are  based  on 1968-86  data.
a. Data for  India  are  only from  the  OECD.
b. IRM  data are  used  for Indonesia,  Malaysia,  and  Thailand;  national  data  are
used for  the  other  countries.
Source: Computed  from  Becsky,  Lee,  and  Ordu  (1990),  tables  2.2,  3.2,  3.9,  3.13,
5.2,  5.°,  6.2,  6.6,  7.1,  and  8.5. The  IMF  data  are  from  the  Balance  of Payments
Yearbook and  International  Financial Statistics.  The OECD data are from
Development  CooReration  Review  and  International  Investments.  The  IRK  data,  which
correspond  closely to recipient  country  national government  data, are from
Dunning  and Cantwell  (1987).  The  national  data are from  central  banks  and FDI
agencies  in  host countries.so
The data for some countries  are unusually  problematic. Argentine  data
reveal  major inconsistencies  among  OECD,  IMF, and  Argentine  national  sources;
there  are  also  mxore  gaps  and  fewer  refined  indicators  for  the  components  of FDI
flows  to  Argentina  than  for  most  other  countries. For  Indonesia,  a combination
of OECD and IMF  data is  required  for  some  analyses;  for the  Republic  of Korea,
national  data  provide  the  most  comprehensive  coverage.
The  Nigerian  data  reveal  some  major  discrepancies  among  the  data  sources.
An extreme  example  is the  Nigerian  data for the  three-year  period,  1979-81,  a
time of governmental  and FDI policy  change  and uncertainty  (see table 7-2).
Depending  on the  source  used,  one  finds  that  the  level  of annual  FDI  flows  (in
current  U.S. dollars)  increased  from  1979  to 1980  and again  from  1980 to  1981,
for  a  net increase  of $500  million  in the  annual  flows  over  the  two-year  period
(as  in  the  OECD  data);  first  decreased  and  then  increased,  for  a  net  increase  of
$239  million  in  the  annual  rate  over  the  two  years  (IMF  data);  or first  increased
and then  decreased,  for a  net decrease  of $256  million  in the level  of annual
flows (Central  Bank of Nigeria  data).  It should  be repeated  that this is an
extreme  example,  but it does  highlight  the problems  of attempting  to analyze
precisely  the  short-term  effects  of  at least  some  individual  events  on the  basis
of  more than  one data  source. 6
For  Nigeria,  as  well  as  most  of  the  other  countries,  however,  the  IMF  data
are best in their  comprehensiveness  of coverage,  clarity  of methodology,  and
availability  for recent  years.  Furthermore,  as indicated  in table 7-1, the
correlations  of the  IMF  data  with  data  from  other  sources  are  moderately  strong
for  most countries.
Table  7-2:  Alternative  Data Sources  for  FDI  Flows  to Nigeria,  1979-81
(current  US$-millions)
Source  1979  1980  1981  1979-81
OECD  -49  206  451  608
IMF  304  -734  543  113
Nationala  481  855  225  1561
a.  Central  Bank of Nigeria
Source:  Becsky,  Lee,  and  Ordu (1990),  table  8-5.51
For the most part, the data presented  here are national  data that  were
created by aggregating  project data reported to host governments  (in some
instances  by home governments). Because  governments  are generally  anxious  to
preserve the confidentiality  of individual  investors'  transactions  and their
stakes  in individual  projects,  it is not feasible  to expect  the refinement  of
readily  available,  official  FDI data to the level  of individual  projects.  In
some instances  governments  do not report  aggregate  data even at the lndustry
level  because  the  aggregate  numbers  would  also  reveal  the  numbers  for  individual
projects.
The  relative  importance  of  individual  projects  can  consequently  be  obscured
in the  aggregate  data. An example is  the  Japanese  liquified  natural  gas (LNG)
projects  in Indonesia  initiated  in  1981.7  With  a total  FDI  value  of  $5  billion,
the  two  LNG  contracts  made  Japan  the  biggest  foreign  investor  in the  Indonesian
onergy sector and in total FDI, thus surpassing  the United States in both
categories.  The relative  magnitude  of this project can be appreciated  by
comparing  the  $5  billion  project  with  total  annual  FDI  inflows  at  the  time  on  the
order of $100-200  million,  an accumulated  total  FDI stock  of approximately  $9
billion,  and  previous  accumulated  Japanese  stock  of $2.5  billion.
Finally,  it should  be noted  that  because  this  paper  focuses  for  the  most
part on flows  of FDI  rather  than  stocks, 8 there  is  one  commonly  noted
data  problem  that is  only  occasionally  relevant  in this  particular  study  --the
use of book values  as the  basis of FDI stock  data.  Such data do not reflect
current  market  values  and  the  effects  of inflation.  Again,  because  the  focus  of
the  present  volume  is  on flows,  with  only occasional  reference  to stocks,  this
particular  FDI data  problem  is  not  central  to the  study.52
NOTES
1.  The  discussion  is  largely  nontheoretical  in  nature-  -an  orientation  that  is
appropriate  given  the  paper's  emphasis  on the  effects  of public  policies
on FDI and the  unsettled  and incomplete  state  of FDI theory.  Selected
items  from the theoretical  literature  on FDI include: Dunning (1988),
Buckley  and  Casson  (1976),  and  Rugman  (1981). New  York,  Columbia.
2.  For  additional  information  about  definitional  issues  and associated  data
issues concerning FDI, IMF (1985, appendix 1; 1977, chapter 18 and
appendix  E; 1981), OECD (1983),  World  Bank (1979,  annex  1),  Becsky,  Lee
and  Ordu (1990,  chapters  1  and 2)
3.  The  present  paper  represents  an  updated  sequel  to  two  previous  World  Bank
Staff  Working Papers (1973,  1979).  In addition,  see the study  by the
Research  Department  of the  International  Monetary  Fund (1985).
4.  IMF  data  were  found  to  be the  best  source  for  most  of the  eleven  countries
in the  country  studies  volume. India,  Indonesia,  Korea,  and  Malaysia  are
partial  exceptions.  See  the  relevant  country  studies  chapters  in  Becsky,
Lee,  and  Ordu (1990)  and  table  4-1 in the  present  volume.
5.  The  UNCTC  data  base relies  on information  from  the  host  countries  and is,
in some  cases,  supplemented  by OECD  data.
6.  These  and  other  issues  about  the  data  sources  are  discussed  at length  for
the  individual  countries  in Becsky,  Lee,  and  Ordu (1990).
7.  Becsky,  Lee,  and  Ordu (1990),  pp. 173-74.
8.  Unless  otherwise  indicated,  the flows  reported  here are "net inflows,"
meaning  investments  in  the  host  country  net  of divestments  and  repayment
of principal on  FDI-related  loans.  Except for  table 2-6  and  the
accompanying  discussion,  investments  abroad  (outside  the  host  country)  and
the  associated  transactions  are ignored.
9.  This is net  of disinvestment.
10.  All data in this  paragraph  are from  Becsky,  Lee,  and  Ordu (1990). Also
see  Svetlicic  (1986),  Kumar  and  McLeod  (1981),  and  Wells  (1983).
11.  Dunning  and  Cantwell,  (1987),  table  8-17,  p. 819.  Data  are for  1974-83.
12.  United  Nations  Centre  on  Transnational  Corporations,  (1988),  table  I-3,  p.
25,  cites  $159.0  billion  as of 1985.
13.  The fluctuation  in the  data  shown  in  Table  2-8  is  at least  partly  due to
the  fact that  it is  drawn  from two  different  sources.53
14.  Because  these  charts  are  based  on constant  U.S.  dollars,  the  descriptions
of the time trends  occasionally  differ from the descriptions  of some
periods  based  on current  dollars  for  the individual  countries  in  Becsky,
Lee, and  Ordu (1990).
15.  Based on IMF data.  As noted in the  appendix  to chapter  1, a different
pattern is evident for NIgeria during the early 1980s in other data
series.
16.  The  principles  of  comparative  advantage  theory  suggest  two  generalizations
about  the  attractiveness  of countries  for FDI  projects  in  view of their
basic economic conditions.  Because every country has  a  comparative
advantage in  producing something, every  country is  also  at  least
potentially  an attractive  location  for  some  kinds  of FDI  projects. Yet,
because  every  country's  comparative  advantage  is subject  to change  over
time,  a country  that is  a relatively  efficient  production  location  for  a
given  product  at one time  may  no longer  enjoy  a  comparative  advantage  in
the same  product  some  year later.  Thus, there  are likely  to be shifts
over  time  in the  geographic  location  of  production  facilities  for  a given
product  as countries'  comparative  advantage  profiles  shift.
17.  Becsky,  Lee, and Ordu (1990)  considers  the "layers"  of Malaysia's  FDI
policy  in  chapter  5.
18.  There  are  indisputably  causal  connections  between  public  policies  and  FDI
flows,  but it  is often  difficult  to isolate  and  verify  those  connections
with  precision.  The  connections  are  frequently  observable  at the  level  of
individual  FDI  projects,  but this  study  is  based  on information  that  has
been aggregated  at the national  level of analysis.  Nevertheless,  the
findings  and conclusions  of this  study  would  presumably  be supported  by
project-level  data and  case  experience.
19.  Although the  main outlines  of the impact  of this particular  series  of
policy  changes  are  clear,  it is difficult  to identify  the  precise  timing
and magnitudes  of the effect  of the policy change  on FDI flows.  One
reason  is that  the  change  in  policy  occurred  over  several  years. Nearly
four  years  elapsed  from  the  initial  signal  of  a policy  reversal  until  all
the  changes  were in  place. A second  reason  it is  difficult  to  measure  the
precise  effects  of  each  policy  change  is  that  actual  FDI  flows  inevitably
lag behind applications  and approvals.  In this instance,  though, the
increase  in  approvals  makes  clear  that  the  changes  in  policy  resulted  in
changes  in  planned  FDI  projects.
20.  See table  8-10 in  Becsky,  Lee,  and  Ordu (1990)  for  the  results  of a 1988
survey  of corporations  with plans  to invest  in  Nigeria. This  discussion
of Nigerian  policy draws directly  and extensively  on the analysis  in
chapter  8 of that  volume.54
21.  The tendency  toward  risk  awareness  is also  reflected  in  other  countries'
data on FDI stock In developing  countries.  German stock data, for
example,  showed  a  declining  share  of FDI in developing  countries  and an
increasing  trend  of  buying  existing  companies.  This,  however,  is not  only
the  result  of  a  decreasing  willingness  to  invest  in  high-risk  regions,  but
also to a large number  of new investors  who are more likely  to start
investing  in familiar  geographical  regions.
22.  The situation  for  macro-level  aggregate  data analysis  for  public  policy
research  and  analysis  is  more  problematic,  as  we have noted  elsewhere  in
this  volume. A new  comprehensive  information  system  is  being  developed  by
the  United  Nations  Centre  on  Transnational  Corporations  and  will  result  in
a Directory  of  Data  on  Transnational  Corporations  and  an  on-line  data  base
for  external  users.  The  data  base  includes  extensive  information  on  FDI
flows,  stocks,  and  international  funds  transfers;  parent  corporations  and
their  affiliates;  international  agreements  and  national  policies;  and
bibliographies  of sources  for  each country.  (United  Nations Centre  on
Transnational  Corporations,  "Data Base and Directory  on Transnational
Corporations,"  October  6, 1988) The  data  base is  an expanded  and  updated
versLon  of Dunning  and  Cantwell  (1987).55
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